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FOREWORD
Counterinsurgency remains the most challenging
form of conflict conventional forces face. Embroiled in
the longest period of sustained operations in its history, the U.S. Army maintains a fragile peace in Iraq and
faces a chronic insurgency in Afghanistan. In much of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, active insurgent conflicts continue and potential ones abound. The United
States may become involved in some of these conflicts,
either directly or by providing aid to threatened governments. Understanding how insurgencies may be
brought to a successful conclusion is, therefore, vital
to military strategists and policymakers.
The author, Dr. Thomas Mockaitis, examines in
great detail how past insurgencies have ended and
how current ones may be resolved. Drawing upon a
dozen cases over half a century, the author identifies
four ways in which insurgencies have ended. Clearcut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but
they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have
often degenerated into criminal organizations committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or into terrorist groups capable of nothing more
than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened
government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the
insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and
persuading the belligerents that they have nothing
to gain from continued fighting, these governments
have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political
process through reform and concessions. This mono-
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graph concludes that such a co-option strategy offers
the best hope of success in Afghanistan and in future
counterinsurgency campaigns.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The study of counterinsurgency (COIN) has
focused disproportionately on its operational and
tactical aspects at the expense of larger strategic
considerations. Foremost among these neglected considerations is the vexing problem of how insurgencies
actually end. Most studies presume that insurgencies,
like conventional wars, conclude with a clear-cut victory by one side or the other. Preoccupation with the
anti-colonial insurgencies following World War II has
reinforced this thinking. However, consideration of a
broader selection of conflicts reveals that most did not
end in such a clear, decisive manner.
This monograph examines 12 insurgencies clustered in four groups based upon how they ended: conflicts in which the insurgents won; conflicts in which
the government won; insurgencies that degenerated
into mere terrorism or criminality; and insurgencies
resolved by co-opting the insurgents into legitimate
politics through a negotiated settlement and reintegrating them into normal social life. The author argues
that Group 4 insurgencies provide the best examples
from which to derive lessons relevant to the United
States acting in support of a state threatened with insurgency. From these lessons, a political strategy of
co-option can be developed—a strategy combing diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement assets in a unified
effort. However, such a strategy can only work when
there is sufficient political will to sustain the protracted effort necessary for it to succeed.
The monograph concludes with consideration of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on conclu-
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sions derived from the 12 case studies, it argues that
the United States has devised the correct strategy for
resolving the Iraq War, and that sufficient political
will exists to see the conflict through to a successful conclusion. The prognosis for Afghanistan is far
less optimistic. The United States adopted the correct strategy for that war only in 2009, long after the
conflict had become a chronic insurgency in which
the Taliban fund their operations through the opium
trade and exercise shadow governance over much of
the country. The conflict has also spread to Pakistan,
which has proven to be a most reluctant ally. Under
these circumstances, the chances of a clear-cut victory are remote. Even achieving a compromise peace
through co-option will be difficult. The United States
must consider that it might have to withdraw without a satisfactory resolution to the insurgency. In that
case, it will need to engage whoever governs Afghanistan to hold them accountable for terrorism launched
from Afghan territory.
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RESOLVING INSURGENCIES
INTRODUCTION
Upon assuming command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus announced to his
troops that “we are in this to win.” Any commander
taking over after the removal of his predecessor amid
a storm of controversy and growing concern about a
timetable for withdrawal would, of course, be expected to make such an assertion. However, the general’s
remarks raise a nagging question that has plagued operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What exactly
does winning a contemporary counterinsurgency
(COIN) campaign mean—destruction of the insurgent organization, elimination of insurgent leaders,
creation of a peaceful stable state that can defend itself, or some kind of negotiated settlement? Difficulty
answering this question stems from a disconnect between military and political strategy.
U.S. Military doctrine focuses on the use or threat
of force to support a COIN campaign. It also calls for
America’s armed forces to lend their considerable assets (transport, logistics, medical, etc.) to the nonkinetic aspects of the campaign. Based upon this doctrine,
the Pentagon devises a strategy for bringing its assets
to bear on the insurgents. However, since kinetic operations form but one part of a comprehensive COIN
strategy, neither military doctrine nor the planning
that flows from it can (nor should) devise such a strategy, which must come from the political leadership.
Unfortunately, that leadership frequently relies on the
military to solve political problems: “In case of emergency dial, 1-800 CALL ARMY.” As one commentary
incisively put it, “There is a studied lack of acknowl-
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edgement on the part of the U.S. Government that the
Long War cannot be fought via conventional warfare
or through a superficial recasting of insurgency and
counterinsurgency.”1 Even when they do recognize
the need for economic and political reforms, policymakers often subordinate these efforts to the military
effort.
While the situation has improved over the past
3 years with the adoption of new approaches to the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenge of
devising a comprehensive COIN strategy remains.
Nowhere is this challenge more clearly articulated
than in the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.
Produced under the direction of the Military Affairs
Bureau of the State Department in 2009, this interagency publication identifies the three components of
an effective COIN campaign: security, economic development, and information operations. These three
components, it insists, should be integrated through a
political strategy “providing a framework of political
reconciliation, genuine reform, popular mobilization,
and governmental capacity-building around which all
other programs and activities are organized.” The ultimate goal of this comprehensive strategy is “to enable
the affected government to control its environment,
such that the population will, in the long run, support
it rather than the insurgents.”2 However, it is precisely
the formulation of this integrative political strategy
that is so often missing from U.S. COIN campaigns.
More often than not, the government deploys the
military in hopes of producing a purely kinetic solution to a complex political problem and only belatedly
develops a comprehensive plan for employing other
elements of national power. Even then, economic and
political strategies often operate independently of or
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only loosely connected to the military effort. Such was
the case for the first few years of the COIN campaigns
in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Failure to devise a political strategy before beginning a campaign may owe something to how COIN
has been studied. Despite repeated lip-service paid
in so many analyses to winning hearts and minds
and to the primacy of politics, researchers have concentrated disproportionately on the military dimension of COIN, focusing in particular on operational
and tactical matters at the expense of larger strategic
considerations. Foremost among these neglected considerations is the vexing problem of how precisely
insurgencies end. Many academics, and more policymakers, appear to operate on the assumption that victory consists in defeating the insurgents by killing or
capturing their leaders and destroying their organizations. This limited notion of end-state arises from the
selection of COIN campaigns upon which many military and academic researchers have usually focused.
In his 2006 article on subversion, William Rosenau
commented on the concerted effort to mine historical examples for answers to contemporary problems.
“Scholars and practitioners have recently reexamined
19th- and 20th-century COIN campaigns waged by
the United States and the European colonial powers,”
he observed, “much as their predecessors during the
Kennedy administration mined the past relentlessly
in the hope of uncovering the secrets of revolutionary
guerrilla warfare.”3 The problem with much of this research, however, is that while some past campaigns
are sufficiently analogous to contemporary conflicts to
provide useful lessons, others are not. David Kilcullen
sounded a note of caution about the enthusiasm with
which analysts embrace the “‘proven’ COIN methods”
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of classical COIN campaigns. “Today’s insurgencies
differ significantly—at the level of policy, strategy,
operational art, and tactical technique—from those of
earlier eras,” he concluded.4 Preoccupation with the
anti-colonial insurgencies following World War II in
particular has reinforced the notion that the destruction of the insurgent organization is the best and most
feasible outcome for a COIN campaign.
A new and growing body of literature has moved
beyond study of the classic insurgencies, but a great
deal more work remains to be done. Ben Connable
and Martin C. Libicki, in How Insurgencies End, offer a detailed quantitative analysis of over 70 cases
based upon outcome considered within the context of
variables such as control of territory and outside support.5 However, the sheer number of cases precludes
detailed analysis of any of them, and some such as
the Bosnia war were not even insurgencies. Still the
work provides a very useful macro view of insurgent
trends and patterns to inform more focused studies,
and it does offer very good conclusions. Victory has a
Thousand Fathers by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke,
and Beth Grill exams 20 different approaches to COIN
based on 57 variables applied to 30 cases divided into
two categories, wins and losses for the government.
It divides campaigns into phases, each of which it
considers based upon 19 factors. The study concludes
by identifying best COIN practices.6 It also examines
conflicts such as Bosnia that are not insurgencies, and
it employs a very complex quantitative model. However, it too contains a wealth of good information
leading to an incisive conclusion identifying good approaches to COIN.
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This monograph builds upon these and other recent works but takes a different approach.7 It examines
only 12 cases in order to focus on each in greater depth
and explores a single variable, how the conflicts were
ultimately brought to a conclusion. It argues that those
cases resolved by a strategy of co-option are most relevant today and concludes with recommendations on
how to develop such a strategy and its implications
for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
APPROACH
This monograph examines past insurgencies
grouped into four broad categories based on their
outcome: cases in which the insurgents won a clearcut victory, cases in which the government decisively
defeated the insurgents, cases in which the insurgency
degenerated into mere terrorism or criminality, and
cases in which the government resolved the conflict
by co-opting the insurgents. It focuses on the last category, whose examples bear the closest resemblance
to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
probably to future insurgencies as well.
Cases were selected based upon factors that heighten their relevance as examples in each category. The
most important factor is the presence of an outside
power in all 12 of them. In each case, the threatened
government was either an occupying nation trying to
set up and support an indigenous government, or a
foreign power intervening to aid an ally threatened by
insurgency. The United States currently offers COIN
support to two threatened governments, and it will
undoubtedly come to the aid of threatened states in
the future. The campaigns span just shy of 60 years,
beginning with the Zionist insurgency against British
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rule in Palestine (1945-47) and ending with the conflict
in Sierra Leone (1991-2002). While earlier campaigns
still offer valuable tactical and operational lessons,
they occurred under circumstances sufficiently different from those of today as to render their value as
strategic examples highly questionable. The cases in
this monograph also include insurgencies motivated
by diverse ideologies (secular nationalism, Marxism,
ethnocentrism, and religious nationalism). While all
insurgencies arise from popular dissatisfaction with
social and economic conditions, the ideology that harnesses this discontent varies with time and place. No
ideology seems to offer any particular advantage to
insurgent or counterinsurgent. Marxists have won
and lost as have nationalists.
INSURGENCY
Clearly defining insurgency has been almost as
problematic as combating it. The U.S. Department of
Defense defines insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”8
Although strictly accurate, this definition is too broad
to be helpful, and it leaves out vital characteristics. Insurgency is a hybrid form of conflict in which a clandestine organization seeks to gain control of a state from
within through a combination of subversion, guerrilla
warfare, and terrorism.9 William Rosenau notes the
lack of an agreed upon definition of subversion, but
points out that the term generally applies to a wide
range of activities employed to weaken a country by
attacking key institutions with means short of armed
conflict.10 The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency
Guide, add two other components to the definition of
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insurgency: propaganda and political mobilization.11
Insurgents spread their ideological message through
various media and organize people to support their
cause. Mobilization usually involves a combination
of persuasion and intimidation. However, a concrete
biological analogy may be more useful in conveying a
sense of what insurgency is than any number of academic definitions. Insurgency is like a virus: It tries to
take over the body it inhabits (a country) and transforms that body to suit its own needs.
From a legal as opposed to a military perspective,
insurgency is equally problematic. Insurgents have
always had an ambiguous status in international law.
Since the 1899 Hague Convention, the laws of war
have granted belligerent rights to irregular forces,
provided that they are under the command of a person responsible for their conduct, wear some type of
recognizable emblem, carry arms openly, and obey
the “laws and customs of war.”12 The 1949 Geneva
Convention afforded the same recognition to irregular
forces. Neither accord, however, addressed the status
of part-time insurgent guerrillas who work by day and
conduct military operations by night. In an effort to address the status of combatants and noncombatants in
noninternational conflicts, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recently issued guidance
on the subject. The ICRC maintains that all persons
not members of state forces or organized groups are
“entitled to protection against direct attack unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”13
Military personnel have been quick to point out that
this guidance affords insurgents a “revolving door of
protection” as they move from their civilian occupation to belligerent activity and back, and that it is for
this reason unworkable.14
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Academic models and legal niceties offer little
practical help to soldiers, who require a functional
rather than a theoretical definition. Such a definition
may be derived from discussing the characteristics
of insurgency, a phenomenon more easily described
than precisely defined. Insurgencies arise from bad
governance. A sizable segment of the population, often regionally concentrated, grows increasingly frustrated with the failure of government to perform its
basic functions or angry at it for consistently exploiting them. Sometimes discontent is primarily political,
especially when people see the government as the tool
of a foreign power or when an ethnic minority has
been oppressed by the majority. In most cases, however, social, economic, and political issues intertwine.
Discontent alone, however, is insufficient to produce insurgency. For centuries, popular rage has
caused sporadic peasant revolts as renowned for their
intense violence as for their utter failure to achieve any
results. Insurgencies require an ideological catalyst
to mobilize discontent and focus it on an achievable
objective, what historian of revolution George Rudé
calls “a common vocabulary of hope and protest.”15 To
be effective, revolutionaries require a certain level of
popular literacy and a means of disseminating their
ideology. These requirements make insurgency a decidedly modern phenomenon.
In addition to ideology, insurgencies require an
organization to direct their campaign against the
government. The organization plans and conducts all
aspects of the insurgency. It trains and equips insurgent guerrillas and decides when and where to deploy them. Traditional insurgent organizations have
usually employed some form of the hub-and-spoke
model. A central committee (the hub) connects to a
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series of cells, which vary in size and may be functionally organized for finance, logistics, etc.16 Usually
only one member of each cell serves as a link to the
hub (the spoke). This model provides excellent security for clandestine organizations. Apprehension of
any single insurgent usually compromises no more
than one cell. Modern communications, especially
mobile telephones and the Internet, have allowed for
more complex organizations. Decentralized networks
with a large number of nodes, some consisting of a
single individual, and considerable redundancy, have
increased security and made targeting insurgent organizations even more difficult.
Guerrilla warfare is a potent weapon of insurgency. The term “guerrilla,” Spanish for “small war,”
dates to Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign. Spanish irregulars harassed French supply lines and ambushed
small units, melting away in the face of superior forces.
Guerrilla tactics are intended not only to wear down
the government’s conventional forces, but to provoke
them into conducting reprisals against the general
population, which they rightly or wrongly perceive as
aiding the insurgents. As U.S. forces in both Iraq and
Afghanistan have repeatedly encountered, insurgent
guerrillas fire from occupied houses and mosques, and
have no qualms about using human shields. They understand that the families of those killed and maimed
will blame the security forces who return fire rather
than the insurgents who initiate the attack.
Besides guerrilla warfare, insurgents also employ
terror to achieve their objective of gaining power.
Terror is a weapon or tactic that can be employed by
many actors, each of whom uses it very differently.
Its goal is to spread fear and create a sense of helplessness among those who witness a terrorist attack.
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States, especially totalitarian regimes, use terror to
keep their own people in line. Criminal organizations
also use terror to intimidate rivals and cow their own
members. Extremist organizations like al-Qaeda use
terror widely and indiscriminately as part of their war
against the West. Insurgents, on the other hand, use
terror more selectively to avoid alienating the people
whose support they wish to gain.17 They use “enforcement” terror to instill fear in wavering supporters and
employ “agitational” terror against representatives
of the government and those who support it.18 To be
effective, enforcement terror has to be somewhat predictable. People need to know what behaviors will
make them targets and what sort of compliance will
keep them safe. Insurgents may, however, be far more
willing to use agitational terror, whose limits may
be determined by their capabilities. The situation in
Iraq from late 2003 to 2007 illustrates the difference
between insurgency and terrorism. Sunni insurgents
fought to gain control of their country, using violence
to that end. Al-Qaeda in Iraq wanted to keep Iraq in
a state of perpetual turmoil as part of the global jihad
against the West.
CHRONIC INSURGENCY AND SHADOW
GOVERNANCE
Traditional insurgents fought to win. They understood that victory might take years to achieve, but
they never lost sight of their ultimate objective, seizing power. A new form of insurgency has emerged in
the post-Cold War world. Some insurgents recognize
their inability to seize power and opt instead to carve
out living space for themselves. They gain control of
an area and exercise alternative or “shadow gover-
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nance” over it, at times doing a better job than the official state. The weakening of state sovereignty in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America has led to the proliferation
of “spaces on the globe that are, for practical purposes,
outside the formal international system.”19 Insurgents
who carve out living space pay lip service to the idea
of ultimate victory, but they fight to maintain the status quo rather than to win. Chronic insurgencies can
drag on indefinitely.
COUNTERINSURGENCY
As the prefix “counter” indicates, counterinsurgency consists of those measures taken by a threatened state and its supporters to defeat an insurgency.
Volumes have been written on this subject, but most
good works recognize the same broad principles for
conducting an effective COIN strategy.20 The key to
COIN is removing the root causes of unrest on which
the insurgency feeds. Often referred to as “winning
hearts and minds,” this aspect of COIN consists of
providing good governance. As Bernard B. Fall observed in the 1960s, a state that loses an insurgency
is “not out-fought but out-governed.”21 What constitutes good governance may vary considerably with
time, place, and culture. In some cases, people simply
wish to be left alone and will fight anyone (insurgent
or government) who threatens their traditional way of
life. An ethnic minority may rebel against a government dominated by those from another group. And
of course, people frequently rebel against foreign occupation.
Developing an effective COIN strategy requires
correctly ascertaining the causes upon which the insurgency feeds. This determination in turn necessi-
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tates listening to local people. Too often an intervening
power has presumed to know best what the people it
seeks to help really need. The U.S. emphasis on elections is a case in point. “The West came into Afghanistan under the mantra of freedom is on the march,”
observed Masood Farviar, manager of an Afghan radio network in a December 2010 interview with National Public Radio, “and elections are the cure-all for
all the problems, without realizing that the last thing
Afghans needed at the time was elections. And the
first thing Afghans needed at the time was security.”22
In its rush to get a government in place—any government—the United States got one with little legitimacy
or real power. A popular joke in Afghanistan has it
that Hamid Karzai is supposed to be president but is
really no more than the mayor of Kabul, and even that
only until it is dark.
The same preoccupation with quick elections occurred in Iraq. As Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor convincingly demonstrate in Cobra II,
the White House’s emphasis on elections at the expense of reconstruction and security not only allowed
the insurgency to develop but has hampered efforts
to counter it ever since.23 An incident following the
Second Battle of Fallujah graphically illustrated the
problem with this approach. Following recapture of
the city, a member of the Interim Governing Council
told a group of its citizens that they had been liberated
and could now have elections. Ignoring his proclamation of this good news, they demanded to know when
the electric and water service would be restored, when
trash would be collected, etc.
The reaction of the citizens of Fallujah illustrates
another important point about winning hearts and
minds. According to Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy
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of needs,” security comes well ahead of “self actualization,” which includes political participation.24
While most people do not expect their government to
meet all or even most of the basic needs Maslow defines, they do want it to safeguard and even facilitate
their ability to acquire the necessities of life through
their own efforts. Economic grievances have been a
major cause of most insurgencies, even those that purported to be about something else. Road building in
Afghanistan illustrates how good governance should
work. Roads link villages to towns and cities, providing people access to markets for their produce. Hiring
local people to build the roads also creates jobs, and,
because it benefits them directly, the locals will also
defend the road from Taliban attack.25
Politics does, of course, matter. People who already
have the necessities of life but lack political rights may
rebel if they feel excluded from or marginalized in the
political life of the nation. Only by creating avenues
for legitimate political participation can such a state
prevent people seeking an alternative through insurgency. When a foreign power intervenes to remove an
oppressive government, free and democratic elections
should be held as soon as possible. To hold them before providing adequate security and restoring basic
government services, however, may be ill-advised.
While it addresses roots causes of unrest, a COIN
campaign must also combat insurgent guerrillas and
terrorists. Deadly force plays an important but limited
role in COIN. A threatened state must, however, make
sure its use of force remains focused and proportional,
or it risks alienating people and driving them into the
arms of the insurgents. The security forces, consisting
of police and military, protect vulnerable targets and
attack insurgent fighters and the organization they
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represent. In so doing, they create a shield behind
which the hearts-and-minds campaign occurs.
Using force in a focused, appropriate manner requires good intelligence. Only by knowing who the
insurgents are can the security forces target them
without causing unnecessary casualties among the
general population in which the insurgents hide. The
best intelligence comes not from covert operations or
coerced testimony of captured insurgents, but from
voluntary cooperation of people persuaded that the
government can protect them, is capable of reform,
and will serve them better than the insurgents. Some
intelligence must be operationally generated through
a process that turns “background information into
contact information.”26
Since insurgents rarely operate in large groups,
large conventional military formations do not function
well in combating them. Platoons and even section are
far more effective at COIN than companies and battalions. For this reason, junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must be trained and
equipped to fight insurgents and encouraged to take
initiative in doing so. The U.S. military describes this
approach as “empowering the lowest levels,” what in
conventional war the Germans call “auftragstaktik.”27
Traditional COIN literature speaks of the need to educate and train “strategic corporals,” NCOs who understand the nature of COIN and the impact tactical
actions have on strategy.
COIN requires the use of all elements of national
power, what U.S. doctrine calls the DIMEFIL: diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement.28 Achieving unity of
effort among the disparate government departments,
the military, and the police implementing these ele-
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ments of strategy is very important but extremely difficult. Using these elements to support a threatened
government which the supporting power does not
control is even harder, but such is the role the United
States currently plays and is likely to play for the foreseeable future.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: FOUR DIFFERENT
OUTCOMES
Group 1: Insurgent Victories.
The period 1945-70 saw the highest concentration
of insurgencies to date. The prevalence of these conflicts derived from a unique set of circumstances following World War II. In 1945, European powers still
controlled most of Africa and much of Asia. However,
the war had weakened them, and the Japanese had
proven that Western armies could be defeated by nonWestern ones. Nationalist movements gained strength
as European power waned. Efforts to reassert colonial
control met with stiff resistance. Nationalist insurgencies drove the French from Indochina, the Dutch
from Indonesia, and the Belgians from the Congo.
This string of victories led some observers to conclude
that insurgency was an irresistible form of warfare.29
Other analysts attributed the insurgents’ success to
the “soft” colonial governments they opposed.30 These
writers argued, correctly as it turned out, that in the
future insurgents would have a much more difficult
time.
Three conflicts in particular commend themselves
as good examples of decisive insurgent victories. From
1944-47, Zionist insurgents drove the British from Palestine and established the state of Israel. From 1954
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to 1962, nationalist insurgents forced the French from
Algeria. Both conflicts blended urban with rural guerrilla warfare. In each case, the insurgents won, not by
defeating the government militarily but by making the
cost of continuing the struggle unacceptably high. International opinion also played a role in deciding each
conflict as did outside support for the insurgency. The
third case occurred in the recent past. From 1997 to
1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army conducted an effective insurgency against the government of Yugoslavia
(by then reduced to Serbia and Montenegro). In this
case, however, the insurgents did not persuade the
hated government to abdicate, but instead induced a
coalition of powers to intervene on its behalf, producing the same result, independence for the province.
Palestine. Britain gained control of what became
the states of Jordan and Israel as part of the peace
settlement that ended World War I. The newly created League of Nations granted them the territory as
a Mandate, an area to be governed and developed by
the United Kingdom (UK) under loose supervision
by the League of Nations. To further complicate matters, Britain had to reconcile its colonial ambitions
with commitments made to Arabs and Jews during
the war. The McMahon-Hussein correspondence of
1915-16 had promised the sons of Hussein, the Sharif
of Mecca, Arab kingdoms as a reward for revolting
against Britain’s enemy, the Ottoman Empire.31 In
1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour
issued the famous Balfour Declaration promising
the “establishment of a national home for the Jewish
people in Palestine.”32 While making these conflicting promises, the British government entered into the
Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), dividing the Middle
East with France.33
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Britain resolved its commitment to the Sharif of
Mecca with the less than satisfactory expedient of setting up his first son, Feisal, as King of Iraq (another Ottoman territory acquired from the Turks) and his second son, Hussein, as Emir (later king) of Transjordan
(carved out of the eastern part of the Mandate of Palestine), both British client states. To honor its pledge to
the Zionists, the British agreed to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine through the Jewish Agency, the
official Zionist organization created for that purpose.
The influx of Jewish immigrants angered Palestinian
Arabs, produced intercommunal conflict, and led to
a full-scale Arab Revolt from 1936 to 1939. The British suppressed the revolt but promised to limit further
Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next 5 years, after which no more Jews would be allowed to enter the
Mandate without Arab approval.34 The Zionists considered this decision tantamount to handing Palestine
to the Arabs. They bided their time until World War II
ended, and even fought alongside the British to defeat
Germany. Then they revolted against British rule.
The Zionist confronted Britain with a complex insurgency perpetrated by three organizations clandestinely linked to the official Jewish Agency. The Irgun
Haganah Ha’ivrith Be Eretz Israel (Hebrew Defense
Organization in Palestine), or “Haganah” for short,
had formed in 1921 to protect Jewish settlements from
Arab attack and was tacitly allowed by the colonial administration, and may even have received arms from
the British.35 A second, more militant group, the Irgun
Zvei Lumi (National Military Organization) broke with
the Haganah in 1931 and conducted reprisals against
the Arabs during the 1936-39 Arab Revolt.36 The third
group, Lochmei Heruth Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), better known as the “Stern Gang” for
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its founder, Avram Stern, was the most militant. The
Haganah numbered 45,000; the Irgun, 1,500; and the
Stern Gang, 300.37
The three groups cooperated to conduct a highly
effective insurgency against the British Army. They
sabotaged rail lines, assassinated members of the security forces, and bombed government buildings, most
notably the King David Hotel in July 1946. The British
replied with tried-and-true colonial methods. They
promulgated emergency regulations that allowed
them to detain suspects without trial, conducted massive cordon-and-search operations, and imposed economic sanctions on the Jewish community.38 While
these measures had a salutary effect on the security
situation, they proved unsustainable. In the end the
insurgents won, not by defeating the security forces,
but by persuading the British government that nothing in Palestine warranted the continued expenditure
in British blood and treasure necessary to retain the
territory.
Insurgent victory derived from the failure of the
British government to win any support among the Jewish population of Palestine. Nothing short of a Zionist
state would satisfy them, and Britain could not deliver
on this demand given its commitments to the Palestinian Arabs and to other Arab states. Without this political offer to win some degree of popular support, the
security forces could not garner the intelligence necessary for them to defeat the insurgents. “The reason
we catch no terrorists,” concluded then Commanderin-Chief Middle East Land Forces General Sir Miles
Dempsey, “is that the people of this country take no
action either directly or in giving evidence.”39 Repression alone might have sufficed had the insurgency
been isolated. However, the Zionists had a powerful
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ally in the person of President Harry Truman. Eager to
secure the Jewish vote in major states like New York
during the 1946 midterm elections, Truman pressured
the British to allow Holocaust survivors to immigrate
to Palestine and to relax security measures within the
Mandate. Increasingly dependent on U.S. aid to recover from World War II, Britain had no choice but to
comply.
Algeria. The French encountered a similar colonial
dilemma in Algeria. Acquired in 1830 and governed
by its European population as a Department of France
with representatives in Paris, the North African territory became the centerpiece of the country’s colonial
empire. By the middle of the 20th century, approximately 1 million French Algerians (known as Colons
or Pied Noir, Black Feet) dominated a population of
8 million indigenous people.40 Nationalism developed
in Algeria as it did throughout the colonial world
during the first decades of the 20th century. Despite
their desire for independence or at least greater political rights, however, many indigenous Algerians
supported France during World War II, expecting to
be rewarded for their loyalty. France answered their
demand for inclusion with a proposal to grant citizenship to a small percentage of native people based on
a merit system. Nationalists answered this proposal
with a large-scale protest in 1945, which the French
suppressed with considerable loss of life. In 1954,
various resistance groups united to form the National
Liberation Front (NLF), which launched an insurgency leading to independence following a bloody 8-year
struggle. However, NLF success owed more to French
COIN and the political crisis it created at home than
it did to insurgent prowess. The French military won
most of the battles but in the process lost the war.
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From 1954 to 1957, the NLF enjoyed considerable
success. The organization recruited 40,000 fighters
for its military wing, the National Liberation Army
(NLA).41 It benefited from a wave of nationalism
sweeping the Middle East and Africa. When its neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, received independence,
the insurgents enjoyed safe havens on their territory
and a source of supply. Although it enjoyed little
popular support at the outset, the NLF employed the
classic insurgent tactic of provoking the government
into over-reacting to its attacks. The NLA assassinated pro-French Muslims and murdered Colons. The
French Army gave the civilians weapons to protect
themselves, which led inevitably to them conducting
reprisals against Algerian Muslims innocent of any
wrongdoing. These reprisals widened support for
the insurgents as did the NLF’s own campaign of intimidation and coercion.42 The situation deteriorated
as France poured in more and more troops, which
reached a total of 500,000, most deployed in static defensive positions.43
Beginning in 1957, the security forces reversed the
deteriorating situation, systematically degrading the
NLF and NLA and maintaining the military initiative
until the end of the war. Contrary to popular perceptions, the French COIN campaign consisted of far
more than systematic brutality, though security force
excesses did cost the army its legitimacy and ultimately lost it the war. The army divided rural Algeria into
operational areas, relocated threatened villages, and
conducted extensive and long-lasting sweeps to disrupt the NLA. While living conditions in most regroupment areas were poor, at least some French officials
tried to use the process as an instrument of economic
and social development.44 The army placed compa-
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nies of soldiers within threatened villages, where they
bonded with local people, and created indigenous defense forces. They also constructed along the Tunisian
border a defensive line backed by artillery and mobile
forces.
None of these effective measures or any combination of them, however, could offset the damage to
French legitimacy done by the brutal tactics of the
army. Nowhere were these excesses more clearly
demonstrated than in the infamous Battle of Algiers.
Beginning in January 1957, forces under the command
of General Massau moved to destroy the NLF network in Algiers. They conducted a detailed census of
all households, divided the Muslim areas into sectors,
imposed population movement controls, and rounded up thousands of suspects. Through the systematic
use of torture, the army gained precise intelligence on
the insurgent order of battle, assembling a detailed
organizational chart called an organogram. This operation destroyed the NLF in the capital in a matter of
weeks, although a second follow-up operation had to
be mounted to disrupt efforts to rebuild it.45
The war in Algeria led to a major political crisis in
metropolitan France. The Fourth Republic fell over its
failure to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion.
Charles de Gaulle returned to power in May 1958 amid
expectations by the army that he would support strong
measures against the insurgents. The new French constitution strengthened the office of president, perhaps
in the hope that doing so would enable de Gaulle
to end the crisis. However, rather than continue the
war, de Gaulle conducted a referendum in which the
Algerians voted for independence. Some generals attempted a coup in April 1961, and when that failed,
they formed a clandestine organization and conduct-
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ed their own terrorist campaign. The French people,
however, had become more upset by the conduct of
their own army than they were with the behavior of
the insurgents and would not support continuing the
war. The Evian Accords negotiated with the NLF gave
Algeria independence in March 1962.
Kosovo. While most insurgent successes occurred
during the era of decolonization, a more recent campaign illustrates that insurgents can occasionally
achieve decisive victory even in the contemporary
world. The insurgency conducted by Kosovar Albanians against the government of Yugoslavia (by
then reduced to Serbia and Montenegro) resulted in
intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which forced Yugoslavia to withdraw
and led to independence for the Province. As with the
campaigns in Palestine and Algeria, the insurgents
could not hope to defeat the government militarily,
but once again, they did not have to do so. Like the
NLF in Algeria, the Kosovo insurgents provoked the
Yugoslav government into a policy of brutal reprisals
that cost it what little legitimacy it had left, produced
international criticism, and provoked outside intervention.
The Kingdom of Serbia acquired Kosovo following the second Balkan War in 1913. Despite its fertile soil and considerable mineral wealth, it was the
poorest province of the former Yugoslavia. By 1991,
the year of the last Yugoslav census, ethnic Albanians
comprised 82 percent of the population; Serbians, 10
percent; and Roma and others, the remaining 8 percent.46 Most Kosovar Albanians practiced a relaxed
form of Islam, which along with language and ethnicity separated them from their Slav orthodox Serbian
neighbors. While most Serbians lived in small islands
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amid a sea of Albanians, they formed the majority in
the region north of the city of Mitrovica.
A decade before its own insurgent movement
struggled for independence, Kosovo had played a
pivotal role in the breakup of Yugoslavia. In 1989, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic spoke at the historic
site of the 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Black
Birds) and declared the province to be the cradle of
Serbian civilization. He revoked Kosovo’s autonomy
and began a policy of removing Albanians from key
positions in local government and the economy, relegating them to the status of a permanent underclass.
Fear of such Serbian domination encouraged separatist movements in other parts of Yugoslavia. The
declaration of independence by Slovenia, followed
by wars in Croatia and Bosnia, kept the international
community occupied for much of the next decade, and
Kosovo fell off the front page.
Isolated geographically and with little outside support, Kosovar Albanians had few options. With open
resistance out of the question, Ibrahim Rugova led a
nonviolent movement to create a parallel state providing health, education, and welfare benefits for Kosavars.47 The situation changed dramatically in 1997.
The government in neighboring Albania collapsed following a financial crisis, losing control of some of its
military arsenals in the process. Contraband weapons
poured into Kosovo, enabling a fringe group to form
in 1993 (the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]) and to
mount an armed struggle against the Serbian regime.
Beginning in the fall of 1997, the KLA launched an assassination campaign against Serbian police, government officials, and Albanian collaborators, which in
turn provoked the kind of reprisals against the general Albanian population the insurgents desired and
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Rugova feared.48 In February 1998, the Yugoslav army
and Serbian paramilitaries launched an offensive in
the Drenica region, which killed 51 people, including 23 women and 11 children; in the ensuing weeks,
another 85 Kosavars were murdered.49 As many as
250,000 people fled the Drenica Region, sparking international fears of a new wave of ethnic cleansing.50
The United States and its NATO allies were unwilling to witness a repeat of the Bosnian tragedy.
Amid escalating violence, the United States led the alliance in a 78-day air campaign that ultimately forced
Serbian withdrawal from the province. After several
years in political limbo as a United Nations (UN) and
NATO protectorate, Kosovo became an independent
nation in 2008. The insurgency had achieved its objective. The new country will require economic support
and security assistance for years to come, but renewed
fighting seems unlikely.
How Insurgents Can Win. These three cases clearly
indicate the circumstance under which insurgents
might achieve a decisive victory. In each case, the
government was seen by the majority of people as an
occupying power with little legitimacy, and the COIN
methods it employed further damaged its cause. The
League of Nations Mandate put a fig leaf of decency
over colonial rule in Palestine. Algeria’s status as a Department of metropolitan France did not alter the fact
that a minority of French Colons governed a native
majority who had few political rights. Although it had
been an autonomous province of Serbia in old Yugoslavia, Kosovo lost its political status when Milosevic
came to power. Its Albanian majority then suffered
discrimination similar to that endured by colonial subjects. Historical and contemporary examples thus support J. Bowyer Bell’s conclusion that insurgents have
been most successful against “soft” colonial targets.51
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However, the unpopularity of a colonial or neocolonial government alone, no matter how oppressive, does not guarantee an insurgency’s success. Despite facing stiff resistance over a decade, the Russian
Federation eventually crushed the Chechen separatist
movement. China has had little difficulty suppressing opposition from its Uyghur minority. In these
cases, two conditions absent in Palestine, Algeria, and
Kosovo explain the insurgents’ failure: political will
and lack of outside support. Both the Russian Federation and China consider maintaining control over
the threatened areas vital to their national interest.
Chechnya’s location in the oil rich north Caucasus region makes it too valuable a piece of real estate to lose.
If China allowed one minority population to secede,
others might follow. Both governments thus have had
ample political will to continue the struggle whatever
the cost. Besides facing a determined, powerful state,
the insurgents could count on neither direct support
nor international pressure to help them. Humanitarian groups might condemn the repression, but no state
or coalition considered intervening even covertly in
the internal affairs of either Russia or China.
In the cases of Palestine, Algeria, and Kosovo very
different circumstances prevailed. Neither the British
government nor its public considered retaining control over Palestine crucial to the survival of the empire,
never mind the state. Nothing the territory offered was
worth the cost in blood, treasure, and international illwill of fighting to keep it. The Zionists also benefited
from outside support. The Holocaust generated great
sympathy for their cause, and they received financial
support from the American Jewish community. The
Democratic Party needed Jewish votes in key states
like New York in the 1946 congressional and 1948
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presidential elections. Britain needed American aide
to rebuild its economy and was amenable to pressure
from the Truman administration to allow more Jewish
refugees into Palestine.
While the French Army considered the loss of Algeria unacceptable, the French public did not. Contrary to what Francois Mitterrand asserted, Algeria
was not France. Having suffered persecution under
Nazi occupation, ordinary French people deplored
the brutal measures being used to keep the territory.
International opinion condemned French colonialism,
but it is unclear what if any role such condemnation
played in the decision to withdraw. The Algerian insurgents also enjoyed a safe haven across the Tunisian
and Moroccan borders. In the final analysis, the cost to
France of remaining in Algeria in blood, treasure, and
perhaps moral capital as well became unacceptably
high. Under these circumstances, the time had come
to go.
In Kosovo, the insurgency followed a different
course. Serbia had both the political will and the military power to retain control of its southern province
indefinitely. However, in this conflict, international
disapproval led to direct intervention. The KLA provoked the Yugoslav police, military and Serbian paramilitaries into heavy handed tactics, including the use
of rape and ethnic cleansing as had been perpetrated
in Bosnia. By 1999, the international community in
general and the West in particular had enough of
such gross human rights violations. NATO, led by the
United States, launched a 78-day air campaign to force
Serbian withdrawal from the province. For the next
decade, Kosovo remained in limbo as talks over its
status continued. Finally, in February 2008, it declared
independence and was recognized by the United
States and some of the NATO allies.
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The circumstances under which insurgents win
outright victories are thus quite specific. The government they oppose is seen as a foreign occupier, which
lacks popular support and faces international criticism. Domestic opinion in the occupier’s home country wanes as the cost of colonial or neocolonial control
rises. The insurgents enjoy material support from outside the contested territory and/or a safe haven in a
neighboring country. In some cases, a foreign power
or coalition intervenes on behalf of the insurgents. A
confluence of such circumstances rarely occurs, which
is why insurgent victories outside the era of decolonization have been few.
Group 2: Government Victories.
If outright insurgent victories seldom occur, unequivocal government triumphs are equally rare. At
the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. Army defeated
an insurrection in the Philippines. In the 1950s, U.S.
forces returned to the Philippines to help its government defeat the Communist Hukbalahap revolt. In the
1960s, the Bolivian government defeated an abortive
Communist insurgency led by Cuban revolutionary
hero, Che Guevara. However, three other cases commend themselves as the best examples of the highly
favorable conditions under which a threatened government can win: the Malayan Emergency (1948-60),
the Greek Civil War (1946-49), and the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka (1983-2009).
Malaya. The Malayan Emergency has long been
hailed as the textbook case of effective COIN. From
1948 to 1960, the British defeated a well-armed and
organized Communist insurgency. While the exact
number of insurgents will never be known, the British
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estimated around 6,500 active fighters with perhaps
as many as 50,000 supporters from a total population
of just over 4.3 million.52 The insurgent guerrillas had
been trained by the British to fight the Japanese and
knew the terrain very well. While the insurgency remained confined to the ethnic minority Chinese, this
group still comprised 38 percent of the Malayan population.
After a few years of trial and error, the British
employed effective COIN methods they had developed during a century of policing their empire. They
based their strategy on four broad principles: winning
the hearts and minds of disaffected people, keeping
the use of force against the insurgents limited and
focused, decentralizing command and control, and
achieving unity of effort between the civil and military sides of the operation.53 At the same time, they
trained and equipped the Malayan police and military
to take over security operations after Britain granted
the colony independence and continued to lend it support for years to come.
The British strategy was dubbed the Briggs plan for
the Director of Operations, Sir Harold Briggs. Briggs
and his staff understood that the key to victory lay in
separating the insurgent cadres operating in the jungles from their supporters among the Chinese population living in squatter villages along the jungle fringe.
The squatters had a low standard of living, lacking
both Malayan citizenship and title to the land they occupied. Discontent reinforced by intimidation encouraged them to support the insurgents. The Briggs plan
relocated the squatters away from the jungle fringe to
“new villages,” which could be more easily protected.
Because the new villages usually offered better housing, running water, schools, clinics, and other ameni-
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ties, most Chinese willingly moved to them. Those
who refused to move, the British relocated by force.54
The program proved so successful, that all but six of
the 480 new villages survived as permanent communities after the war.55
The Briggs plan laid the foundation for successful
COIN in Malaya. Relocation, Briggs noted, was not in
itself a solution, but it did provide “that measure of
protection and concentration which makes good administration possible.”56 Controlling the population
allowed the security forces to reduce the insurgents’
food supply. It also improved intelligence gathering,
as people are more likely to talk if the government can
protect them. Improved intelligence allowed the army
to use force in a more focused manner.
Effective COIN requires unity of effort. At the local level, three key officials (the police chief, the army
battalion commander, and the District Commissioner)
had to work closely together. To facilitate cooperation,
the British created a system of emergency committees from District to State to Federation level. The appointment of General (later Field Marshall) Sir Gerald
Templer as both High Commissioner and Director of
Operations (DO) achieved unity of effort at the top,
which had been lacking under Briggs, who held only
the DO position. Templer energized the campaign.
He insisted that every District Emergency Committee
meet at least once a day, “if only to have a whiskey
and soda in the evening.”57
The final ingredient of successful COIN was decentralization of command and control, what the U.S.
military now calls “empowering the lowest levels.”58
Large conventional formations are worse than useless
in pursuing guerrillas who melt away before them.
Platoons or even sections can hunt them far more ef-
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fectively. However, small unit operations can only
succeed if senior commanders delegate responsibility,
which British commanders proved willing to do. “The
only thing a divisional commander has to do in this
sort of war,” quipped one brigadier, “is to go around
seeing that the troops have got their beer.”59 To further
enhance effectiveness of small unit tactics, the British
used “framework deployment,” assigning a battalion
to a single area for an extended period of time so that
soldiers could get to know its terrain and people.
Impressive though the Malayan campaign was,
it would be a mistake to overlook British advantages in waging it. Malaya was a valuable piece of real
estate worth defending for its resources and strategic location. Rubber production funded much of the
COIN campaign. The insurgency remained confined
to the minority Chinese population, who could be
won over with offers of citizenship and land. Despite
their Communist affiliation, the insurgents received
no outside support, nor did they enjoy a safe haven,
since Malaya’s one land border (with Thailand) was
too remote and inhospitable to provide access to sanctuary. As colonial masters, the British could also use
draconian measures that would be unacceptable to a
democratic state in today’s climate of transparency.
Together with its allies, Britain saw the campaign as
an anti-Communist crusade, not colonial oppression.
Furthermore, internal conflict did not end with British
withdrawal. Malaysia faced a decade more of strife,
which included insurgency in North Borneo, a cross
border war with Indonesia, and the amicable split
with Singapore. These advantages notwithstanding,
the British approach to COIN has much to commend
it and continues to be worth studying.
Greece. Although the United States had no formal empire, it did control territory in the Pacific and
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behaved in a paternal manner towards the governments of small nations in the Caribbean and Central
America, its self-proclaimed sphere of influence. From
1900 to 1940, it faced insurgent conflicts in these areas.
Unfortunately, much of the wisdom gained in these
operations was lost when the military developed into
a massive conventional force to fight World War II.
During the Cold War, American forces once again engaged in COIN, supporting states threatened by Communist revolution.
The first such conflict occurred in Greece (194649), where a Communist insurgency with more than
50,000 fighters vied for control of the country amid the
chaos at the end of World War II. The British liberated the country from the Axis, attempted to disarm
all guerrilla bands, and supported a pro-Western government. However, fiscal constraints forced Britain
to end its support of the Greek government in March
1947. With Communist governments controlling Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria,
Greece looked to be the last bastion of democracy in
southeastern Europe.
Determined that the country should not fall,
President Harry Truman provided $723.6 million
in aid plus 800 military and 700 civilian advisors.60
The Americans pursued a conventional approach to
COIN, insisting that the infantry move in to fix the
enemy so that artillery could destroy them, although
they also criticized Greek forces for indiscriminate
firing, which killed innocent civilians.61 This conventional approach, which under different circumstances
would have cost the government popular support,
succeeded largely because of insurgent mistakes and
fortuitous circumstances. Much of the fighting occurred in remote mountainous areas where excesses
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went largely unnoticed. In addition, the insurgents
accepted battle on terms favorable to the government.
Believing that the time was right for large-scale operations, they reorganized their forces from small bands
of 50 to 100 into “brigades” and “divisions.”62 These
larger formations could be more easily targeted by the
Greek Army supported by the Americans. The following year, the Communist government of Yugoslavia
quarreled with the Kremlin and closed its border to
the insurgents, depriving them of the safe havens and
supply bases they had enjoyed. Finally, the kidnapping of thousand of Greek children to be “educated”
in Communist countries cost the insurgents popular
support. Thus, with minimal attention to winning
hearts and minds, the Greek government achieved a
conventional military victory over an unconventional
foe. From this “success” story, the U.S. military drew
the mistaken conclusion that conventional methods
could counter unconventional threats.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The third example
of a clear-cut government victory occurred in Sri Lanka, where the Singhalese-led government fought a 26year war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). The Tamils are a Hindu ethnic group from
Southern India who comprise 10 percent of Sri Lanka’s
21 million people. The majority Singhalese population
considered that the Tamils had collaborated with the
British, who ruled the island as Ceylon.63 They thus discriminated against the Tamils when the colony gained
independence in 1948. The new state made Singhalese the official language (excluding Tamil) and disenfranchised Tamil migrants from India. In response
to this discrimination, Velupillai Prabhakaran created
the LTTE (successor to another insurgent group, the
Tamil New Tigers) in 1976 to campaign for a Tamil
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homeland. The conflict began in 1983 when the LTTE
ambushed an army convoy, killing 13 soldiers; 2,500
Tamils died in subsequent retaliatory riots.64
The LTTE soon gained control of large areas in
northern and eastern Sri Lanka. In the process, Prabhakaran eliminated other Tamil resistance leaders and
imposed tight control over the Tamil community. The
LTTE became a parallel state, exercising shadow governance in the territories it controlled. It developed
police, judicial, and economic institutions and ran its
own schools.65 The Tigers also had perhaps the most
impressive financial network of any insurgent group.
Most of its money came from the 600-800,000 member
Tamil diaspora community through a combination of
voluntary contributions and extortion. North Korea
may also have supplied the LTTE with arms and training. Even when international efforts led to a 70 percent decline in foreign funding, the organization still
managed to raise $200-300 million per year from its
licit and illicit businesses.66
These resources allowed the LTTE to create an impressive military force. At its height, the insurgents
could field as many as 15,000 fighters, of whom 7,000
were combat trained.67 It had an impressive arsenal of
weapons, including long-range artillery, and captured
armored vehicles as well as mortars and small arms.68
The LTTE even had a small naval wing, the Sea Tigers.
With its formidable arsenal and extensive resources,
the LTTE proved capable of defending most Tamil areas.
The insurgents also took the fight to the government and its allies through a highly effective terrorist campaign. They assassinated several high-ranking
officials, including Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, whose troops had intervened against the Tamils
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(1991), Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa
(1993), and the Sri Lankan Industry and Foreign Ministers (2000 and 2005). The LTTE proved particularly
adept at suicide operations, developing a dedicated
cadre, the Black Tigers, specifically for the purpose.
The Black Tigers pioneered the suicide vest, a garment
packed with plastic explosives and shrapnel (often
ball bearings).69 They frequently used women as suicide bombers; the women could carry a larger payload
by feigning pregnancy, knowing men would be reluctant to search them.
Like the Greeks, the Sri Lankans took a largely
conventional approach to their unconventional conflict. Wining hearts and minds proved extremely
difficult once the violence escalated. Besides limited
local autonomy, a threatened state has little to offer
an ethnic separatist movement that wishes to dismember the nation. Had the 1948 constitution granted the
Tamils even limited local autonomy and use of their
language, however, the insurgency might never have
occurred. By the 1980s, these concessions no longer
satisfied Tamil aspirations. The Singhalese would
not compromise the territorial integrity of the state,
and the LTTE had the resources and popular support
to defend and even govern its enclaves. Under these
circumstances, the conflict consisted of periods of intense fighting interspersed with uneasy truces amid
a steady stream of terrorist attacks. Indian intervention in the mid-1980s accomplished nothing on the
ground, but did provoke the assassination of Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Both the government and the insurgents, meanwhile, racked up a long
list of human rights violations.
Over time, however, circumstances changed in favor of the government. The LTTE had never garnered
support or legitimacy outside Sri Lanka and its own
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diaspora community. Tolerance for terrorism in any
form plummeted after September 11, 2001 (9/11), and
concerted attacks upon terrorist financing hurt the Tigers. More importantly, heavy handed tactics began
to erode the LTTE’s support base in the Tamil population, especially as the Singhalese government became
more attentive to human rights and more willing to
engage in meaningful reform. An insurgency that uses
more terror to keep its own people in line than it does
in fighting the government is on its way to defeat. The
LTTE also suffered from the fatal weakness of over-reliance on a charismatic but dictatorial leader. During
the first decade of the new century, the government in
Colombo exploited these weaknesses, working with
dissident groups in the Tamil community. More and
more Tamils fled south to Singhalese territory to escape Prabhakaran’s brutal rule.
A July 2009 interview with a top LTTE commander who defected in 2006 reveals growing problems
within the organization. Colonel Karuna Amman had
been one of Prabhakaran’s body guards and advanced
to second-in-command of the organization’s armed
forces. As commander of the Tigers’ eastern enclave,
Karuna led a force of 6,000 Tamil fighters. When he
disbanded his troops and defected to the government,
he left the province vulnerable to capture by the Sri
Lankan Army in 2007. A mixture of Prabhakaran’s
rigid rules and personal cowardice (he always stayed
away from the fighting), disillusioned Karuna as did
the leader’s intransigence. Karuna said he had opposed the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi because it
brought international condemnation on what had
been until then a Tamil liberation movement. Finally,
he explained, despite growing signs that the LTTE
could never win a military victory, Prabhakaran refused to seriously pursue a political settlement.70
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The dénouement came with the Sri Lankan Army’s northern offensive of 2008-09. In January 2009,
the army captured the LTTE “capital” of Kilinochchi.
They squeezed the remaining Tigers into a smaller
and smaller area in the Northeast, which they systematically decimated with artillery. Human rights
groups and the UN condemned the Sri Lankan army
for indiscriminate shelling but were equally critical
of the LTTE for using the trapped population as human shields. The LTTE fighters shot civilians trying
to flee the combat zone. In May, the Sri Lankan Army
killed Prabhakaran and several of his associates as
they sought to escape. Other LTTE leaders committed
suicide. The remaining Tigers laid down their arms,
and the 26-year conflict came to a close.
Defeating Insurgents. Drawn from different times
and regions, the three cases in this group offer some
compelling conclusions. Governments win outright
victories over insurgents only under very favorable
circumstances. All three insurgencies occurred in geographically isolated areas. Malaya is a peninsula with
dense jungles along its only land border. Sri Lanka
is an island. Greece is a peninsula that became a virtual island for the insurgents once Yugoslavia closed
its borders to them. Insurgent disadvantages and/or
outright mistakes further contributed to government
success. The Malayan Peoples Liberation Army was
confined to the Chinese minority community as the
LTTE was to the Tamil. Greek insurgents accepted
battle on terms favorable to the Greek Army, trained
and equipped by the United States. All three insurgent
groups exploited people in the areas they controlled.
The LTTE was exceptionally brutal, and the Greek
insurgents kidnapped thousand of Greek children
whom they sent to Communist countries for “educa-
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tion.” The LTTE had the added disadvantage of reliance on a charismatic leader, who could not be easily
replaced. Threatened governments can seldom count
on such favorable circumstances. Thus while the three
cases in this group yield valuable operational and tactical lessons, they are not suitable models for contemporary COIN strategists.
Group 3: Degenerate Insurgencies.
Insurgency has a shelf life—it succeeds, fails, or
degenerates into something else. As previously noted,
most unconditional insurgent victories belong to the
era of decolonization, and the few clear-cut government victories occurred under a very specific combination of circumstances that seldom occur. Insurgent
movements that fail to achieve their goals and yet
avoid defeat sometimes degenerate into mere extremist organizations, capable of carrying out terrorist attacks but of doing little else, or they morph into criminality. The Basque separatist organization, Fatherland
and Liberty, illustrates the former case, while Peru’s
Shining Path and Colombia’s narco-insurgency, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), illustrate the latter.
The Basque Separatist Movement. The Basque separatist movement (ETA) began in much the same way as
the LTTE. The 20,664 square kilometer Basque region
straddles the Pyrenees. Approximately two-thirds of
this territory and most of the region’s 3 million people
are part of Spain; the remaining people and territory
belong to France. Because the Basques backed the
Republicans in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), the
fascist dictator Francisco Franco systematically oppressed them when he came to power, banning their
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language, suppressing their culture, and arresting
their intellectuals.71
Discouraged by the failure of nonviolent protest
to achieve reform, the Basques launched an insurgency against the Spanish government. ETA’s active
strength probably numbered in the hundreds during
its heyday, with thousands more supporters.72 The
ability of the organization to rapidly replace losses
suggests that its active deployment reflected the optimum number of fighters for the combat environment
rather than limits on its ability to recruit. Beginning in
the 1960s, ETA attacked police and other government
employees, first in the Basque region itself and then in
the Spanish capital of Madrid. The group achieved its
most dramatic success by assassinating Franco’s handpicked successor, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, with
a bomb placed under his car in 1973. Many Spaniards
quietly approved the killing, sharing the joke that the
admiral was Spain’s first astronaut.
The insurgents’ greatest achievement also started
a chain of events that led to its decline. Franco never
found another suitable successor. Following his death
in 1975 and restoration of the monarchy, democracy
returned to Spain. A new constitution (1978) addressed most Basque grievances, granting the region
limited autonomy, allowing use of the Basque language for official purposes, and restoring cultural institutions. However, these concessions did not satisfy
ETA, which continued its campaign of violence. With
the authoritarian regime removed, the movement
launched its most intensive wave of attacks after reform had progressed considerably.73 ETA’s deadliest
year was 1980, during which it killed 76 people.74 The
pattern of attacks also changed. Previously the group
had targeted police, military, and government officials
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in classic insurgent fashion. Now it targeted innocent
civilians. In its most infamous attack, ETA bombed a
Barcelona shopping mall in 1987, killing 21 people.
The Franco regime had seen no need to mount a
COIN campaign. Repression kept ETA in check and,
while the group garnered sympathy, it had no real
support outside the Basque provinces. The restoration of democracy weakened the oppressive instruments of state control and necessitated a more sophisticated response to the insurgency. Concessions to
Basque nationalism formed a major part of the new
approach. Madrid granted the province limited local
autonomy, restored universities and cultural institutions, and permitted use of the Basque language. The
government also went on the offensive. ETA had long
benefited from its safe haven in the French Basque region. During the Franco era, Republican France had
been disinclined to cooperate with fascist Spain. The
situation did not improve significantly after Franco’s
death, so the Spanish resorted to extra-legal covert
operations. The Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación (Anti-terrorist Liberation Group, or GAL) assassinated
suspected terrorists in the Spanish and French Basque
regions, killing 27 people in 25 attacks.75 GAL, one of
several such groups, turned out to be sponsored by
the Spanish Interior Ministry.76 Although GAL death
squads drew widespread criticism, they did encourage France to abandon its policy of tacitly allowing
ETA to operate within its territory. Paris and Madrid
signed an extradition treaty depriving ETA of its safe
haven in Basque territory across the Pyrenees. They
later agreed to allow hot pursuit of suspects by French
and Spanish police 60 kilometers on either side of the
border. Within Spain, a government crackdown reduced the organization’s effectiveness. ETA declared a
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ceasefire in 1998, and many considered the insurgency
over. The Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004,
raised the disturbing possibility that a new generation
of ETA members had cooperated with al-Qaeda. However, no evidence of such a connection has ever been
produced. ETA violence has been reduced to sporadic
attacks within the Basque Province.
Most analysts now consider ETA to be a localized
terrorist organization. Autonomy and reform have removed most of its popular support. Absence of a corresponding movement in the French Basque region
has kept independence an unrealized and unrealizable dream. For a small cadre of extremists, however,
the struggle defines who they are, so they will continue their campaign of violence no matter how futile
it has become.
Shining Path. The second case of a degenerate insurgency occurred in South America. From 1980 to
2009, Peru engaged in a bitter internal struggle, which
left 70,000 dead amid widespread atrocities committed by all parties. The People’s Communist Party of
Peru, more commonly known as Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path), began in the late 1960s as a student
movement led by Abimael Guzmán, who taught at the
San Cristóbal of Huamanga University in the province
of Ayacucho. In an environment of social inequality,
labor unrest, and racial discrimination experienced by
the indigenous population of the Peruvian highlands,
Guzmán prepared for armed struggle, building an insurgent organization to fight the government. Shining
Path adopted the Maoist model of protracted people’s
war, seeking to liberate rural areas out of which to
expand and eventually overwhelm the cities.77 At its
peak, Shining Path had around 10,000 active members
and a much larger number of supporters.78 Guzmán
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declared the insurgents’ goal to be “removing all the
political authorities and landlords, rubbing out all
functionaries. The rural areas should be thrown into
confusion, the land cleansed before we sow and build
up revolutionary bases of support.”79 Shining Path
assassinated police, other government officials, and
large landholders.
Local police lacked the resources and training to
handle the deteriorating situation, so the government
sent in the military. The Peruvian army made the same
mistakes common to all conventional forces faced with
insurgency, conducting large-scale sweeps through civilian areas. The operations netted few insurgents but
produced widespread human rights abuses. Minister
of War General Luís Cisnero admitted that soldiers
and special police units would kill 60 people of whom
perhaps three were insurgents.80 From 1982 to 1989,
the Peruvian Attorney General’s Office reported 3,200
cases of “enforced disappearances,” probably perpetrated by the security forces.81 These heavy-handed
tactics, combined with a draconian anti-terrorism law
applied stringently to declared “emergency zones,”
and allegations of torture to obtain intelligence, cost
the government support and benefited the insurgency, which expanded out of its base into other rural
areas and into the cities of Cuzco and Lima. In the
upper Huallaga Valley, the insurgents developed a
patronage-client relationship with coca growers, who
provided Shining Path the economic resources to expand its campaign.82
Fortunately for the Peruvian state, Shining Path
began to lose the support of the people it purported
to represent. It proved to be just as brutal as the army
in forcing the peasant population to comply with its
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wishes. In 1989 alone, the insurgents carried out 1,298
assassinations and murdered another 1,116 “subversives.”83 Shining Path forced farmers to supply its cadres and forbade them to sell their produce to the cities.
These measures significantly reduced the peasants’
quality of life. In one town, insurgent measures created a food shortage that reduced average per capita
consumption to one meal per day.84 Peasants may have
initially welcomed the insurgents but quickly grew to
resent their oppression. Resentment prompted organized resistance as local villages, often with government help, formed civil defense committees to resist
the insurgents.
Popular resistance was but one element in a series
of circumstances that turned the tide of the conflict in
favor of the government. In the mid-1980s, another
Marxist group, Túpac Amaru, entered the struggle
against the Peruvian government. Rather than work
together, the two groups fought one another to the
detriment of both. At the same time, the Peruvian
military improved both its human rights record and
its COIN tactics. British advisors helped to train the
army based on the British experience in Malaya,
Oman, and Northern Ireland. The government began
a hearts-and-minds campaign, including a crop substitution program in the coca growing areas. The British stressed the importance of intelligence in defeating
Shining Path.85 In 1990, the government created a Special Intelligence Group.86 The emphasis on intelligence
paid a handsome dividend in 1992 with the capture
of Guzmán. The police searched the trash from a suspected safe house and found skin cream used to treat
psoriasis from which they knew the insurgent leader
suffered. Based on this intelligence, they raided the
safe house and captured Guzmán, along with several
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of his associates. Deprived of its charismatic leader,
Shining Path began to decline. It also suffered from
strategic over-reach. Success in rural areas and even
in some cities led the insurgents to believe that they
could move more aggressively against the government. This mistake allowed the state to use its superior resources to good effect.87
Having won the military struggle, however, the
government of Peru failed to win the ensuing peace.
Rather than consolidate its success by improving conditions in rural areas and pursuing the small remnant
of the insurgency that survived, the government reverted to its policy of neglect. As a result, Shining Path
has revived in a remote region of the Andes, where
it has become a major coca producer. It now figures
significantly in the region’s thriving narcotics trade,
having forged links with its Brazilian and Colombian
counterparts. By 2008, the group was strong enough to
attack a military convoy in the Huancavelica Region.
It continues to carry out small scale attacks against
police often in response to coca eradication and other
anti-narcotics operations. While it seems unlikely to
return to being a viable insurgency, at least in the near
future, Shining Path will remain as a criminal organization for a long time to come.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) was formed
in the aftermath of a long period of political violence.
The country’s two main parties had fought a 17-year
civil war, la violencia (1948-65), in which as many as
400,000 people died.88 Unhappy with the peace settlement and unwilling to support either political party,
Marxists formed the FARC, as well as several other
insurgent groups, including the National Liberation

43

Army and the Popular Liberation Army; another revolutionary group, M-19, had no clear ideology.89 Over
time, the FARC emerged as the most important insurgent group.
In addition to its pervasive insurgency, Colombia
also faced a serious threat from large-scale narcotics trafficking organizations. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the Cali and Medellín cartels developed a near vertical monopoly on the cocaine trade, controlling coca
growing and refining in Colombia and cocaine distribution throughout much of Europe, Africa, and North
America. Ordinary crime, corruption, and poverty
compounded the country’s security problems.
The FARC established base camps in remote jungle areas and along the borders of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Those countries have proven unable
or, in the case of Venezuela, unwilling to expel them.
Poor peasants gave the insurgents a source of recruits
and a base of support, while coca provided a ready
source of cash to buy weapons. However, in the first
few decades of the insurgency, narcotics-trafficking
was a means to an end, not an end in itself. During
the 1990s, the FARC expanded out of its rural bases to
operate within Colombia’s cities, including the capital
of Bogota. Rural groups cooperated with urban networks and increased their revenue through extortion,
kidnapping, and money laundering.90 The conventional tactics of the Colombian armed forces proved
ineffective against the insurgents. Corruption, human
rights violations, and gross economic inequality exacerbated the problem.
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana
joined forces with U.S. President Bill Clinton to launch
Plan Colombia, a concerted effort funded largely by
the United States, to deal with narco-terrorism. Many
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assessments have been scathingly critical of the plan,
noting its emphasis on a purely military solution and
its failure to address the chronic social and economic
problems that underlay both the insurgency and the
narcotics trade.91 Corruption siphoned off millions of
dollars of U.S. aid and human rights abuses abounded,
the dirty work farmed out by the Colombian armed
forces to right-wing paramilitaries. In many respects,
the Plan made a bad situation worse. Widespread
fumigation of coca growing areas and sweeps by the
army increased migration to the cities, swelling the
ranks of the urban poor and increasing crime.
Plan Colombia actually helped the FARC by dividing the attention of the Colombian armed forces
between drug cartels and insurgent groups, while
failing to address the obvious connection between
narcotics and insurgency. Military aid came with
restrictions, allowing, for example, helicopters to be
used for drug interdiction but not for COIN.92 In fact,
while it engaged the drug cartels with force, the Colombian government negotiated with the FARC. Pastrana recognized the insurgent organization as a legitimate political party and ceded them 40 percent of
Colombia as a demilitarized zone in the southern part
of the country. This zone provided the FARC a secure
area in which it created a shadow government and a
narcotics-based economy.93
The anti-narcotics program also contributed to the
FARC’s degeneration from an insurgent organization
into a drug cartel by restructuring the cocaine trade.
Destruction of the Cali and Medellín cartels in the
1990s and the further disruption of narcotics trafficking organizations through Plan Colombia eliminated
much of the FARC’s competition in the cocaine production business. By 2001, the Plan had resulted in the
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destruction of 818 coca base labs, the aerial spraying
of 84,000 hectares of coca growing land, and the extradition of 21 drug kingpins.94 The FARC capitalized on
the disruption of traditional drug cartels by expanding
its own narcotics operations. However, as the FARC
transitioned to a predominantly criminal enterprise,
the Colombian government intensified its campaign
against the insurgents. Alvaro Uribe Velez won the
2002 presidential election, promising to deal with the
FARC, whose unwillingness to negotiate in good faith
strengthened popular support for a purely military
solution to the insurgency.95 True to his word, Uribe
launched a sustained offensive against the insurgents.
At the same time, he disarmed right-wing militaries,
increasing the legitimacy of his own armed forces.
This military campaign achieved striking results.
From 2003 to 2009, the Colombian military claimed to
have killed 10,806 members of the FARC and captured
26,648; another 11,615 demobilized of their own accord.96 Estimates of current FARC membership range
from 7,000-10,000, half of its peak strength of 17-20,000
in 2000.97
Despite these heavy losses, the FARC has proven
remarkably resilient. It has coped with the new situation by decentralizing its command and control, abandoning large-scale operations for guerrilla tactics,
making excellent use of land mines, and rebuilding
its base of support in remote areas among indigenous
people.98 In the process of adapting to a less friendly
security environment, however, the FARC has become less like a revolutionary insurgency and more
like a narcotics cartel, or perhaps like a series of smaller criminal outfits. It is a major player in the cocaine
industry, thanks to the restructuring of the drug trade
inadvertently caused by the U.S.-backed drug war.
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This effort destroyed the cartels, which had enjoyed a
vertical monopoly of the cocaine trade from production through distribution. They have been replaced by
a series of smaller groups controlling various aspects
of the process. The Mexican criminal organizations
have benefited from the disruption of Caribbean trade
routes, gaining control of land smuggling through
Central America and building a vast distribution network in the United States.99The FARC, which had previously taxed coca growing and processing, now controls these stages directly.100 The role of middlemen in
the operation, those refining the coca paste and feeding it into the Mexican distribution system, has been
taken over by 200-400 “new illegal armed groups” or
“baby cartels.”101
The Colombian government has reduced the
FARC’s strength, perhaps even to the point where it
no longer threatens survival of the Colombian state.
However, the insurgents have carved out a living
space in which they exercise shadow governance.
Dislodging them from that niche has proven very difficult. FARC groups continue to be well armed, organized and funded by drug money. Barring some significant change in these circumstances, they are likely
to remain a permanent fixture in the Colombian underworld, along with a host of other nefarious groups.
Why Insurgencies Degenerate. Insurgencies have a
shelf life. They succeed, fail, or degenerate into mere
terrorism or criminality. In most cases, this degeneration occurs when the government wins the military
struggle but fails to win the peace that follows. If insurgents are not reintegrated into legitimate society
and politics, they will continue the struggle in the
hope (however forlorn) of one day restoring their fortunes and winning the war. In those cases in which
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the criminal activity that once funded the insurgency
proves extremely lucrative, they may engage in criminality as an end in itself.
Group 4: Success Through Co-Option.
Understanding how and why insurgencies degenerate suggests a strategy for resolving them more
effectively. Insurgencies that cannot be decisively
defeated by a traditional COIN strategy may be resolved through co-option. A threatened government
must fight the insurgents to a standstill and then find
a way to draw them into the legitimate political process. Three campaigns commend themselves as useful examples of victory achieved through co-option:
Northern Ireland (1969-2005), El Salvador (1979-92),
and Sierra Leone (1991-2002).
Northern Ireland. The longest insurgency Britain has
ever faced began innocently enough as a civil rights
movement. Northern Ireland remained part of the UK
when the rest of Ireland gained independence in 1921.
The Province’s Protestant majority systematically subjugated the Catholic population through institutionalized discrimination and the use of draconian emergency laws. Gerrymandered election districts kept
Catholics under-represented, even on the councils of
local communities in which they were the majority.
Protestants received a disproportionate share of public housing, and Catholic unemployment exceeded
Protestant by a factor of 2.62 to 1 in 1971.102 To enforce
this system of apartheid, the authorities made extensive use of the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act, which gave them extraordinary powers of arrest
and detention without trial. The almost exclusively
Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the UK’s
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only armed police force, could call upon its paramilitary reservists the “B Specials” to handle unrest.
Inspired by the nonviolent civil rights movement
in the United States, Catholic students at Queens University, Belfast, created the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association and began demonstrating to protest discrimination. Their protests turned violent during the summer of 1969, when demonstrators clashed
with members of Protestant Orange Lodges during
marches to commemorate the 1689 siege of Derry. Rioting spread throughout the province, and on August
14, the hard-pressed police asked London for troops.
What began as a temporary deployment soon turned
into a COIN campaign that would last almost 40 years.
Despite having more COIN experience than any
other army in the world, the British spent 3 years of
trial and error, making many mistakes that would
hamper their effort for the remainder of the conflict.
Many of these errors arose, however, because the
troops operated in support of a provincial government that used them to defend the Protestant ascendency. The government in Westminster compounded
the problem by declaring Catholic neighborhoods in
Belfast and Londonderry “no-go areas,” pulling back
the army and police in hopes that doing so would
quell unrest. This strategy had exactly the opposite effect. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA),
which split from the main organization that had
fought for Irish independence in 1919-21, moved in to
fill the void, transforming the civil rights movement
into an armed struggle to expel the British and unite
Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic. PIRA grew
dramatically, increasing from 100 members in January 1970 to 800 by December, and began to attack the
army and police with sniping and bombs.103 The insur-
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gents enjoyed widespread support among Catholics.
The number of active fighters at any given moment
arose from a strategic decision on optimal deployment
rather than from lack of volunteers. PIRA also had a
safe haven across the border in the Irish Republic. The
conflict continued to escalate as security force actions
made a bad situation worse. The army conducted
massive searches in the Lower Falls Roads area of
Belfast, turning a “sullen Catholic population into a
downright hostile one.”104 Large-scale internment of
Catholic suspects, most of whom were innocent, further alienated the population, as did “interrogation in
depth,” the controversial tactics (hooding, wall standing, sleep deprivation, etc.) that have caused so much
controversy at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.
The downward spiral culminated in the January 1972
incident known as Bloody Sunday in which British
paratroopers opened fire on demonstrators in Derry,
killing 13.
By the end of 1972, the conflict had settled into a
familiar pattern. The security forces hunkered down
for a long struggle, and PIRA reorganized itself into a
hub-and-spoke cell system, whose hub (the “general
staff”) resided safely across the border in the Irish
Republic. Tit-for-tat killings took the lives of numerous Catholics and Protestants, as PIRA and Protestant
paramilitaries such as the Ulster Defense Association
murdered ordinary Catholics and Protestants. The
British military deployed its elite Special Forces unit,
the Special Air Service (SAS), to support its 12 infantry battalions and the RUC. The SAS soon became
embroiled in controversial killings, which added
more fuel to the flames of unrest. For its part, PIRA
began bombing targets in England. Meanwhile, the
insurgents received financial support from the Irish-
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American community and weapons from the government of Libya, which also allowed PIRA to train on its
territory.
Meanwhile, the British government undertook
much needed political and social reform in the province. It began by revoking provincial autonomy, ruling
Northern Ireland directly from Westminster. London
poured billions of pounds sterling into improving living conditions in Catholic neighborhoods in hopes of
undermining support for the insurgents. By 1992, the
Northern Ireland Housing Authority had built 17,000
new homes in Belfast and another 1,800 in Londonderry.105 The differential in unemployment, especially in
the public sector, improved somewhat after the British
passed strong anti-discrimination legislation. Equality
had hardly been achieved, but living conditions for
Catholics improved significantly.
The summer of 1989 saw the 20th anniversary of
what both sides refer to as “the Troubles.” Two decades of fighting had produced a military stalemate.
The British Army could not destroy the PIRA, but the
PIRA could do little more than persist in its desultory
struggle.106 It had failed to accomplish the one thing
essential to victory: persuading the British public that
the cost of retaining Northern Ireland had become too
high. The conflict had not been an issue in any of the
British General Elections since 1969. Under such circumstances, stalemate worked against the insurgents
as ordinary Catholics and Protestants grew weary of
the incessant conflict. Under such circumstances, the
door for a negotiated settlement opened wide. As historian Richard English concludes, the insurgents realized that “their own violence was going neither to win
the war, nor to improve upon a bargaining position
that offered both definite results and the prospect of
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increasing rewards achieved through political process.”107
Washington and Dublin supported peace talks, as
did London. However, because Conservative Prime
Minister John Major depended on 12 Protestant Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland to maintain
his slim majority, he had limited negotiating room.
Major did achieve a temporary ceasefire in 1994, but a
peace accord would have to await the Labour Party’s
1997 landslide victory. Tony Blair achieved what none
of his predecessors could, a lasting peace leading to
a power-sharing agreement that brought insurgent
leaders into a Northern Ireland government via their
political party, Sinn Fein. The Good Friday Accords
signed in 1998 provided both immediate peace and a
continuing peace process that would bear fruit over
the next decade, thanks in no small measure to the
9/11 attacks, which discredited all forms of terrorism.
It was no accident that Jerry Adams announced decommissioning of PIRA’s weapons right after al-Qaeda’s July 2005 bombing of the London Underground.
The power-sharing executive still does not function
very well, but renewal of the insurgency seems unlikely. Ordinary Catholic men and women are heartily
sick of war.
El Salvador. The Salvadoran civil war (1979-92)
provides another good example of how to resolve an
insurgency through a combination of military force,
political reform, and diplomacy, all supported by an
outside power (the United States). However, none of
the parties to the conflict anticipated or wanted such
an outcome. The insurgents were determined to overthrow a corrupt and brutal regime that was equally
determined to crush them. The United States, under
the leadership of its staunchly anti-communist Presi-
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dent Ronald Reagan, paid lip service to human rights
but was far more interested in defeating the Marxist revolutionaries. Only the confluence of fortuitous
circumstances and a change in the U.S. approach,
perhaps brought on by the election of George H. W.
Bush and the end of the Cold War, made possible success through co-option, a resolution to the conflict by
drawing the insurgents into the legitimate political
process within a reformed state.
In 1979, El Salvador was one of the poorest countries in Latin America and one of the most undemocratic. Fifteen families controlled an economy in
which 1 percent of the population (approximately 4.7
million) owned 70 percent of the land.108 The military
routinely intervened to prevent reform, suppress rebellion, and support the oligarchs. When the army
blocked land reform in 1979, opposition turned violent. In 1980, various resistance groups united to form
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN),
named for a Communist Labor leader and organizer.
The movement enjoyed considerable support among
the country’s rural peasants and urban poor, which
increased as the army and paramilitary death squads
(composed of off-duty soldiers) conducted reprisals
against those even suspected of supporting the insurgents. The FMLN fielded 12,000 fighters supported by
a much larger group of noncombatants.109
From 1980 to 1983, the insurgents had the upper
hand against a conventional army filled with demoralized conscripts. The FMLN enjoyed support from
Cuba, the new Communist Sandinista government in
Nicaragua, and, indirectly through these intermediaries, from the Soviet Union. They had safe havens in
remote border areas of Honduras and Guatemala. The
insurgents became strong enough to overrun the Air
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Force’s main airbase, destroying most of its aircraft on
the ground, which enabled them to operate in large
columns and engage substantial army formations. As
large areas of the country fell under FMLN control,
U.S. military advisors warned that, without substantial support, the Salvadoran government would lose
the war.110
The Reagan administration responded with a massive infusion of economic and military aid. However,
the experience of Vietnam was too fresh for the American public to sanction direct intervention by U.S. forces. The new approach to COIN, known as the Nixon
Doctrine, promised “foreign aid for internal defense,”
including deployment of small Special Forces teams to
advise and train the host nation’s military. However,
the horrible human rights record of the Salvadoran
armed forces made it difficult for the United States to
justify even this limited assistance. In the most infamous incident, the American-trained Atlacatl battalion massacred almost the entire village of El Mazote in
December 1981. All told, the security forces murdered
approximately 50,000 unarmed civilians, most during
the early 1980s.111
The Reagan administration did, of course, care
about human rights, but not as much as it cared about
fighting communism. The Salvadoran military correctly deduced that the United States would not make
aide contingent upon improving its human rights
record, so it resisted pressure to do so. Equipment,
training, and money allowed the military to stem but
not reverse the FMLN tide. Airplanes and helicopters
forced the insurgents to rely less on large-scale operations in favor of traditional guerrilla tactics and to
concentrate on attacking economic targets rather than
the Salvadoran army.112 However, it still retained the
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ability to mount a major operation. In November 1989,
the FMLN launched an offensive against the capital
San Salvador, occupying some of its wealthiest neighborhoods. While the offensive did not threaten the
survival of the state, it made a mockery of Salvadoran
military claims that the FMLN would soon be defeated. To make matters worse, members of the army
murdered six Jesuit priests, along with the wife and
daughter of a custodian at the University of the Americas. The FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces had
reached a stalemate.
This stalemate, along with drastically altered political circumstances, made both parties amenable to
a negotiated settlement. The fall of the Berlin Wall
lead to diminished support for both parties to the
conflict.113The government and the insurgents both
moderated their demands. The FMLN backed off its
insistence on power sharing and much of its social
agenda, while the government proved amenable to
reducing the size, power, and influence of the army.
A ceasefire followed by almost 2 years of negotiations
under the auspices of the UN facilitated by the United
States led to the signing of peace accords in January
1991.
The accords began by restructuring the security
sector. The army would be reduced by 50 percent
(by 1993) and confined to defending national sovereignty from external threats. The National Guard,
Treasury Police, and National Police, which had been
under military control, would also be disbanded and
replaced with a new civilian police force. Some former FMLN guerrillas were integrated into the new
police force; the rest were demobilized. The accords
called for a National Restructuring Plan, which provided land grants to 47,500 veterans from both the
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Salvadoran Armed Forces and the FMLN.114 The constitution was amended to expand the electorate and
institute other reforms. As a result, the FMLN became
the second party of the country. On March 15, 2009,
its candidate, Mauricio Funes, became President of El
Salvador. Despite this electoral victory by the former
insurgents, El Salvador remains a U.S. ally.
While the American intervention in El Salvador
can hardly be called an unqualified success, it nonetheless provides useful lessons for resolving insurgencies. The conflict killed 75,000 of El Salvador’s 5.3
million people (1990), most of them innocent civilians.
The United States invested $3.2 billion in economic
and $1.1 billion in military aide trying to destroy the
FMLN.115 Only when military victory seemed improbable, and in the face of vastly altered circumstances,
did it settle for the second-best solution of a negotiated settlement. El Salvador remains an impoverished
country with a grossly inequitable distribution of
wealth. However, current economic conditions and
the cost of the conflict in blood and treasure aside, the
accords have produced a remarkably durable peace.
Both parties have seen that they can accomplish their
goals through a political process that has a high degree of integrity. The case of El Salvador suggests
that sometimes the best outcome to a conflict is one
in which both sides believe they have won. Had the
United States pursued such a compromise solution
from the outset, the same result might have been accomplished with far less bloodshed.
Sierra Leone. The tiny West African nation of Sierra
Leone provides the third example of insurgency resolved through co-option. When it received independence from the British in 1961, the country possessed
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a decent infrastructure, a trained professional civil
service, and a lucrative resource—diamonds. However, deep ethnic divisions and a culture of corruption eroded these advantages. Poverty, inequitable
distribution of wealth, and political repression fueled
unrest.
In 1991, the country had a population of 4.27 million, 99 percent of them Africans belonging to 13 different tribes. Per capita annual income was $325, literacy 21 percent, and life expectancy was 42 years.116
For 6 years, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)
governed the country. In 1967, the All People’s Party
(APP) narrowly won elections, and Siaka Stevens became prime minister. Three military coups, based in
part on tribal considerations, rocked the country over
the next year. After the restoration of order, Stevens
resumed his office and in 1971 transformed Sierra
Leone from a parliamentary democracy to a republic with himself as President, an office he would hold
until 1985. In 1978, he amended the constitution and
made the country a one-party state.
Although Stevens sowed the seeds of insurgency,
his hand-picked successor, Joseph Momoh, would
reap them. Under mounting international pressure,
Momoh set up a constitutional review committee to
consider political problems, but he had little incentive to restore real democracy. Revolution offered the
only alternative to continued one-party rule. In 1991,
a group of students and other dissidents led by Foday
Sanko formed the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
and launched an insurgency against the Momoh government. RUF operated from safe havens in neighboring Liberia, also in a state of civil war, and enjoyed the
support of Liberian strongman Charles Taylor, as well
as the assistance of mercenaries from neighboring
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Burkina Faso.117 The RUF soon gained control of some
of the country’s diamond mines, giving the insurgents
a lucrative source of revenue to buy weapons and support its operations. Because “blood diamonds” could
not be sold on the open market, the insurgents laundered their rough diamonds through Ivory Coast and
other willing neighbors.118
The success of RUF put Sierra Leone on a roller
coaster of violence inflicted first by the insurgents,
then by the government. Momoh was replaced by
a coup and fled the country. The new government
could not halt the advance of RUF, which by 1995 was
poised to overrun the capital of Freetown. To prevent
the defeat, the military leadership hired mercenaries
from the South African company Executive Outcomes
(EO), who helped stem the RUF tide. Free elections
in 1996 led to a ceasefire, which collapsed after yet
another coup. The following year, troops of the Economic Organization of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) restored civilian government
and enforced a ceasefire. Peace Accords were signed
in 1999, to be implemented by a UN mission with 6,000
troops, and RUF joined a coalition government. However, peace ended with the withdrawal of ECOMOG
troops in April 2000. In May, violence broke out in the
capital. The UK sent troops to evacuate British subjects and restore order. A new ceasefire held. Elections
in 2002 saw the SLPP win a decisive victory, while
RUF failed to gain a single seat. From 2002 to 2006,
the British and UN gradually withdrew their troops as
rebel forces demobilized. The peace has held, thanks
in no small measure to the United States ending the
civil war in neighboring Liberia.
As in the cases of El Salvador and Northern Ireland, resolution of the conflict came as a result of mili-
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tary stalemate. Without external support from EO,
ECOMOG, the British Army, and the UN, the insurgents would have won. However, while each of those
forces restored civilian rule, none of them was willing and/or able to destroy the RUF. By staying long
enough to maintain order, though, the UN and the
British convinced the insurgents that they could not
win in the foreseeable future. The end of the Liberian
civil war and mounting international pressure made
it clear to the RUF that they could accomplish little by
continuing the armed struggle. These circumstances
paved the way for a viable peace through a process
of demobilizing and reintegrating insurgent fighters
into civil society, while including their political wing
in legitimate politics.
The 1999 Lomé Peace Accords created the framework for conflict resolution, though a lasting ceasefire did not occur until 2002. The accords granted an
amnesty for combatants and provided for “transformation of the RUF/SL [Sierra Leone] into a political
party,” participating in a coalition government. The
Accord also dealt with security, allowing former insurgents to join Sierra Leona’s new armed forces
“provided they meet established criteria” for doing
so. The new armed forces would also reflect the ethnic
makeup of the nation as would the legislature, which
had seats designated for tribal chiefdoms. Those insurgents who did not serve in the new armed forces
would be cantoned, demobilized, and reintegrated
into society in a manner to be determined and with
outside financial support.119
The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) oversaw implementation of the peace accords. In 2003, it
reported that, although the security situation was stable, border areas remained a problem, especially the
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Liberian border because of the civil war in that country.120 Two years later, the situation had improved
considerably with the end of the Liberian conflict. The
biggest security problems were delay in implementing
reintegration programs for former fighters due to lack
of funds and high unemployment, especially among
young people.121 UNAMSIL came to an end 6 months
later. By the fall of 2010, the situation had improved
so much that the new UN Peace Building Commission
focused on ordinary crime, corruption, and narcotics
trafficking rather than political violence as the most
serious security problems.122
The sad episode of Sierra Leone is hardly one of
which the international community can be proud.
Only after the country had become a virtual failed state
did the UK and the UN intervene. Nonetheless, they
successfully resolved the conflict through a combination of co-option and development. ECOMOG, and
later the British, fought the insurgents to a stalemate,
creating circumstances for a negotiated peace accord,
whose implementation was overseen by the UN. Economic and social development continues, albeit at a
slow pace, but renewed civil war seems unlikely for
the foreseeable future. Had it not been for international intervention to force a negotiated settlement, RUF
might have become like FARC, a criminal enterprise
controlling Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond trade.
Winning through Co-option. The three cases examined suggest that the best resolution for insurgency is
one that allows both sides to believe they have won.
Living conditions for Catholics in Northern Ireland
have improved dramatically, and the institutions of
government, especially law enforcement and justice,
function more equitably that at any time since partition. Power-sharing remains problematic, but neither
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side wishes to resume violent conflict. The FMLN succeeded in making El Salvador a functioning democracy, even if they fell far short of achieving a just economic order. Development in Sierra Leone continues
slowly, but the political system has been reformed to
accommodate ethnic divisions that contributed to the
outbreak of civil war.
LESSONS
The four groups of insurgencies examined in this
monograph yield definite lessons that may inform
not only the conduct of COIN campaigns by the U.S.
Army, but the larger political question of what American intervention to support a threatened state can
realistically accomplish. To being with, the six campaigns in Groups 1 and 2 clearly indicate that only under very unusual circumstances do insurgencies end
in clear cut victory for one side or the other. Insurgents may win if the government they oppose enjoys
little support or even tolerance by its own people, if
they have a source of supply and a safe haven across
a friendly border and/or external support, and if the
threatened government is not supported by a friendly
power that considers the cost in blood and treasure
of a protracted intervention worthwhile. With few exceptions, such favorable circumstances occurred only
during the 20-year period of decolonization following
World War II.
Complete government victories have been almost
as rare as insurgent triumphs. A threatened government can win if it can address the root causes of social
and economic unrest on which the insurgency feeds
while isolating the insurgents from outside support,
and provided it enjoys support from a friendly power,
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or at least the acquiescence of the international community as it suppresses the insurgents. The British
victory over Malayan Communists occurred on a
peninsula with a virtually impenetrable northern border, defeat of LTTE occurred on an island, and the
U.S.-backed Greek government won after Yugoslavia
closed its border and isolated the insurgents.
Unfortunately, the examples in Group 3 represent
a large and growing category of degenerate insurgencies that plague the world today. The longer a conflict drags on, the more likely that the insurgents will
degenerate into mere terrorists, capable of carrying
out limited attacks but of doing nothing else, or that
the insurgent organization will transform itself into
a criminal enterprise with or without the ideological
cover of legitimate revolution. Groups like ETA that
degenerate into small terrorist organizations can probably be eliminated or reduced to insignificance over
time as popular support for them wanes if the government considers it cost-effective to destroy rather than
just contain them. Insurgencies that become criminal
enterprises are far more problematic, especially if
they have access to a lucrative resource like narcotics.
The Colombian government has reduced the FARC’s
strength and constrained its operating space to the
point where it no longer threatens survival of the state.
In the process, it has inadvertently aided the group’s
transition to a criminal enterprise. Shining Path has
undergone a similar transition owing to failure of the
Peruvian state to consolidate its success in the 1990s
through economic and social development in the areas in which the insurgency enjoyed support.
The best way to prevent insurgencies degenerating into chronic problems is to resolve them before
they reach that point. The cases in Group 4 suggest
the most promising approach to achieving such reso62

lution. In each case, the threatened government settled on a strategy of co-option only after prolonged
efforts to defeat the insurgents failed. Only when they
reached military stalemate, a situation in which both
sides realized that they could not decisively win a military contest, did the belligerents resolve their conflict
through negotiation and compromise. Achieving such
a stalemate is costly in blood and treasure. However,
had co-option been the goal from the outset, the same
result might have been achieved earlier with less loss
of life. On the other hand, PIRA, the FMLN, and RUF
had to be convinced that they could achieve little by
continuing armed struggle before they would negotiate in good faith. Thus, while the period of military
conflict may be shortened, it probably cannot be eliminated. The insurgents must be fought to a stalemate.
In each Group 4 case, intervention by an outside
power proved crucial to resolving the insurgency.
Northern Ireland is, of course, part of the UK, but the
government in London behaved much like an intervening power in the province. Certainly the Catholic
population and even many Protestants perceived it as
a foreign entity. By 1998, however, London had come
to be seen less as an occupier and more as an honest broker. Its position on Northern Ireland was clear.
Any change in the political status of the province required approval of the majority of Northern Irish men
and women. Until then, it must be governed fairly
through some sort of power-sharing arrangement. In
El Salvador, the United States provided the military
and economic aid necessary for the Salvadoran government to fend off the FMLN. After the 1989 insurgent offensive, the United States pushed its ally to the
negotiating table, making aid contingent upon reform
and an improved human rights record. In Sierra Le-
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one, EO, ECOMOG, Britain, and the UN intervened to
prevent RUF from seizing power. However, none of
these entities could or would engage in a protracted
campaign to defeat the insurgents completely. Intervention combined with growing international pressure on the blood diamond trade may have prevented
RUF from becoming an African FARC. At the end of
the day, it had more to gain from negotiations than it
did from continued violence. In each of these cases,
the intervening power(s) also remained engaged after
peace accords had been signed, providing advice and
material assistance during the delicate process of demobilization and reintegration of combatants.
A STRATEGY OF CO-OPTION
The U.S. Army’s strategic thinking on COIN
should be based upon two premises. First, during the
foreseeable future, the Army’s only COIN role will
be to support a threatened state. Second, based upon
the preceding analysis of past campaigns, insurgencies can best be brought to a successful conclusion
through a strategy of co-option. While it involves the
use of military force, such a strategy is first and foremost political. The following broad recommendations
might provide guidance in developing a strategy of
co-option:
1. Develop a Comprehensive Strategy Before Deploying.
Any time American forces deploy to invade a country
or act in support of a threatened state, policymakers
should devise a comprehensive strategy for all contingencies, including a protracted COIN campaign and/
or a significant nation building effort. This strategy
should integrate diplomatic, informational, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement

64

components into a unified political strategy rather
than treating nonmilitary elements as ancillary to a
predominantly military campaign. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been more costly in lives and
treasure than they might have been had policymakers
developed a contingency plan for a protracted COIN
campaign before the conflicts began.
Several Army officers and some policymakers
pushed for such a plan in the immediate aftermath of
the invasion, but the Pentagon blocked their efforts,
wishing to withdraw troops as soon as possible. Richard Haass, who served as the Bush administration’s
coordinator for the future of Afghanistan, wanted
a post conflict stability operation. “I pressed for a
U.S. military presence of some 25,000–30,000 troops
(matched by an equal number from NATO countries),”
he reported. These troops would have been “part of
an international force that would help maintain order
after the invasion and train Afghans until they could
protect themselves.” His suggestion got a cool reception. “My colleagues in the Bush administration had
no interest in my proposal.” 123 Administration policymakers had the same reaction to suggestions about a
follow-on mission in Iraq. As early as March 19, 2003,
the Special Operations Force staff officer working on
Phase IV (post-conflict) plans urged preparation for a
protracted COIN campaign. He was explicitly told not
even to mention the word “counterinsurgency.”124
2. Intervene sooner rather than later. Insurgencies are
like fires. The sooner they are spotted, the easier they
are to put out. Governments have been slow to recognize and respond to insurgent threats and even slower
to request outside help. Delay gives insurgents time
to widen their base of support among a disaffected
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population. COIN requires not only a timely response
but an appropriate one, a response that does not overrely on conventional military means, which usually
make a bad situation worse. Since governments, like
individuals, have a hard time recognizing their own
problems, a supporting nation like the United States
should advise its allies about the internal threats it recognizes and encourage them to ask for help in a timely
manner.
3. Steepen the Learning Curve. Almost every COIN
campaign begins with a period of trial and error as
conventional armed forces adjust to unconventional
war. Even when the military in question has had extensive COIN experience, a period of adjustment still
occurs. Despite half a century of imperial policing and
COIN, the British army took about 3 years to get it
right in Northern Ireland, the same amount of time
the United States needed to develop an appropriate
strategy for Iraq. While some period of adjustment is
probably inevitable, it need not be as long as it has
been to date. By preserving both contemporary experience and the learning institutions that teach it to new
recruits, such as the Human Terrain Mapping System,
the Leadership Development and Education Program,
and other such education and training programs, the
U.S. Army can steepen the learning curve for future
campaigns and reduce the adjustment period.
4. Keep the U.S. Foot Print as Small as Possible. The
larger the U.S. force deployed to aide a threatened ally
and the longer it remains, the more it will look like
an army of occupation. Under such circumstances, the
insurgents may then be able to transform the conflict
into a nationalist struggle against the hated foreigner,
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winning even more support for their cause. U.S. advisers and supporting forces must make the host nation
fight its own war. Keeping the American or coalition
presence as small as possible is the best way to accomplish this goal. A handful of advisers in El Salvador
accomplished a great deal, especially during the last
phase of the war. The doctrinal guidance under which
they operate still has much to commend it today. Field
Manual (FM) 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict (1990) warned that deploying too many U.S.
troops would “Americanize” the conflict, “destroying
the legitimacy of the entity [the threatened government] we are attempting to assist.”125
5. Make U.S. Aide Contingent upon Political Reform
and Regard for Human Rights. A threatened government that refuses to become more responsive to the
needs of its own people deserves to lose. The highly
desirable outcome of the Salvadoran Civil War might
have been achieved sooner and with far less loss of
life had the Reagan administration taken the same
approach as its successor. The real threat of a reduction or cut off of U.S. aid encouraged the Salvadoran
government to negotiate with the FMLN. The inability or perhaps unwillingness of the United States and
its allies to pressure the Karzai government to reduce
corruption sufficiently to regain its legitimacy is seriously undermining the COIN effort in Afghanistan.
However, making aid contingent upon reform is
much easier said than done. If a threatened government realizes its importance to the United States, it
can resist pressure, knowing it will still get aid. The
Salvadoran government understood this fact as does
the Karzai regime. Reforming in the middle of a con-
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flict may also make a government more vulnerable to
subversion. Under such circumstances, a willingness
to engage in political reform and a long-term plan
for doing so, coupled with some highly visible first
steps, may be the most that can be done in a crisis. It
is also important to remember that “reform” does not
mean creating a Western-style democracy, but rather
increasing the legitimacy of a government in the eyes
of its own people based upon their needs and expectations. A demonstrated willingness to compromise and
to negotiate with insurgents is, however, crucial to the
success of a co-option strategy.
While engaging in political reform is a tortuous
process that takes time, avoiding human rights violations can and must be done immediately. The correlation between repression and government defeat is very
high.126 Indiscriminate use of force against innocent civilians, torture of suspects to gather intelligence, and
other human rights violations undermine government
legitimacy and usually lead to defeat. The communications revolution has made every person with a cell
phone a potential reporter and increased transparency
to such a degree that knowledge of abuses rapidly becomes public.
6. Harmonize COIN and Anti-Crime Efforts. Insurgencies develop in an environment of weak governance. In such an environment, much of the economy
is grey or black, and organized crime often thrives. A
government threatened by insurgency usually faces
significant criminality as well. Given the nexus that
often develops between these two threats, a strategy
to fight one must also tackle the other. Focusing on
COIN while ignoring organized crime (or vice versa)
may have the undesirable effect of diminishing the one
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problem while exacerbating the other. Insurgents may
join criminal enterprises and/or insurgent groups
may become criminal organizations themselves.
The link between insurgency, organized crime,
and narcotics trafficking is particularly problematic.
FARC and Shining Path funded their insurgencies
with money from the cocaine trade. Both have transformed themselves into criminal enterprises. Opium
production funds the Taliban and al-Qaeda; enriches
members of the Afghan government, including President Karzai’s own brother; and provides a subsistence
living for many poor farmers. Eradication efforts have
focused on the farmers, who make little money and
are often forced by the Taliban to grow poppies. Depriving these farmers of their cash crop without giving them an alternative and providing them the security in which to grow it helps the insurgents, not the
government.
7. Win the Peace. Every time U.S. forces deploy, the
American public asks, “When will the troops come
home?” Political discourse around missions often reduces to a single, most unhelpful question: “Should
we stay or should we leave?” The answer is “neither,”
if staying means becoming a permanent occupier and
leaving means withdrawing all U.S. forces by a fixed,
pre-determined date. The key to successful COIN lies
in remaining engaged with the threatened government in the appropriate way for each stage of the protracted conflict. The period after the end of hostilities
is crucial. Shining Path has revived in Peru because the
Peruvian government failed to consolidate its success
against the insurgent organization with economic and
social development in the areas where the insurgents
enjoyed popular support. The Iraqi insurgency broke
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out largely because the United States lacked the troop
strength and the determination to maintain law and
order, and did not have a viable reconstruction plan
following the fall of Baghdad. Better planning and
preparation might have prevented the looting and
concomitant damage to infrastructure that occurred,
and perhaps the insurgency would never have gotten off the ground. At the very least, the lawlessness
would have been less widespread.
The U.S. Army does not, of course, get to pick its
wars, and so it cannot insist that the above conditions
be met before it deploys. For example, U.S. advisors
understood the importance of respecting human rights
in winning the Salvadoran conflict, but they were powerless to pressure Salvadoran officers who knew that
Washington cared more about fighting Communism
than it did about preventing abuses. To reaffirm an
often quoted but frequently ignored truism of Clausewitz, “war is an instrument of policy,” and policy is
made by civilians. Civilian politicians must answer to
voters impatient for results. Only when the very survival of the nation is at stake will the American people
support substantial expenditures in blood and treasure over an extended period of time. Intervening to
support an ally threatened by insurgency is rarely a
popular mission.
While the military does not (and should not) make
policy, military officers are frequently asked their
views on policy issues. At such times, they can and
must raise the difficult concerns discussed in this analysis. Foremost among these concerns should be the
question of whether the U.S. Government can sustain
political will for a protracted COIN campaign abroad,
a question that must be asked before it deploys U.S.

70

forces. If it does not seem likely that political will can
be sustained, the intervention should be seriously reconsidered.
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN
An analysis of this nature would be incomplete
without consideration of its implications for the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars
have been underway for 7 and 9 years respectively,
and it is, of course, neither possible to correct mistakes
made early in each nor to foresee precisely how each
will end. Nonetheless, the conclusions herein do allow for assessment of the U.S. effort to date in each
case and for commentary on the direction each mission seems to be heading. The assessment bodes well
for the Iraq mission but raises serious concerns about
operations in Afghanistan.
For its first 3 years in Iraq, the United States made
every mistake that can be made in an unconventional
operation. To begin with, American forces entered
Baghdad without a plan to conduct a protracted
COIN campaign. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the
Army had subsumed COIN into broad task groups
such as “Low-Intensity Conflict,” “Operations Other
than War,” and “Stability and Support Operations,”
catch-all categories for missions that it did not want
to perform and preferred to relegate to Special Forces. This decision left the vast majority of the regular
forces unprepared for a protracted COIN campaign.
While several military manuals published after Vietnam reveal this dislike of unconventional conflict, two
in particular illustrate the limited role the U.S. military
expected to play in COIN.127 FM 100-20: Military Opera-
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tions in Low-Intensity Conflict (1990) asserted that “U.S
military support to insurgencies . . . will normally center on security assistance program administration efforts that complement those of other U.S. Government
agencies.”128Joint Publication (JP) 3-07: Doctrine for Joint
Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict echoed this theme,
asserting that U.S. support for COIN would usually
be limited to “furnishing suitable material, training,
services, and advisors.”129
While lack of training for and experience with
COIN hurt the campaign, the overwhelming failure
lay in the realm of political strategy. The Bush administration deployed too few troops for the task at hand.
Many senior officers, including Army Chief of Staff
General Eric Shinseki and the former Central Command Commander General (retired) Anthony Zinni
had argued for a more robust invasion force with a
follow-on peace and stability mission. However, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ignored this advice on the size of the invasion force and dismissed
the need for a post-conflict stability operation. As a
result, the Army and Marines invaded with more than
enough troops to defeat the Iraqi armed forces but
far too few to occupy and maintain order in a country more than twice the size of Idaho, with 26 million
people. The troops they did have lacked the training,
equipment, and experience for an internal security operation, which the administration had determined beforehand not to perform. Many observers complained
that the Pentagon “seemed to be more concerned
with persuading the U.S. electorate that invading Iraq
would not lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire than it
was with the vagaries of post-war nation building.”130
The conflict took a turn for the better with a change
of course in 2007. In late 2006, a bipartisan Study
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Group warned that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating.131 Contrary to popular belief, the new “surge”
strategy adopted by the coalition involved much
more than the deployment of 20,000 to 30,000 additional U.S. troops. Under General David Petraeus,
the United States took greater advantage of the “Anbar Awakening,” a spontaneous, ad hoc movement
among Sunni Iraqis in Anbar province. The Awakening began in 2005 when leaders from the Abu Mahal
tribe approached the Americans, asking for help to
fight al-Qaeda in Iraq, which threatened their historic
position in Anbar. Petraeus recognized that since both
the Americans and the Iraqis hated the foreign mujahedeen, he could make strategic use of this grassroots movement, which by the end of 2007 numbered
65,000 to 80,000 (many of them former insurgents).
Concerned Local Citizens Councils (CLCs) facilitated
cooperation between the Sunni Tribes and coalition
forces.132 Supported by funds from the Commanders
Emergency Response Program, CLCs produced the
kind of cooperation that yielded good intelligence so
that the military could use force in a focused, effective
manner with minimal collateral damage.133 This willingness to work with local Iraqis, including former
insurgents, has been very effective. Along with improved programs to train Iraqi soldiers and police, the
new strategy allowed the United States to reduce its
troop strength to 55,000 during the summer of 2010.
The new U.S. COIN approach is exactly the sort of
co-option strategy, albeit on a much larger scale, that
worked in Northern Ireland, El Salvador, and Sierra
Leone. The United States began as an occupation force
but gradually transitioned to the role of a supporting
power. In that role, it has pushed for reintegration of
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former insurgents into legitimate politics and social
life. Despite sporadic intercommunal violence, Iraq
continues on a path towards peace and stability. The
United States will need to remain engaged with and
supportive of the Iraqi government for years to come,
but there is every reason to believe that doing so will
produce the desired result: an independent, democratic and stable Iraq capable of defending itself from
internal and external threats.
The situation in Afghanistan is far less encouraging. The war unfolded in a very different manner
than the invasion of Iraq and under circumstances far
less favorable to establishing peace and stability. The
United States also missed a window of opportunity
to defeat the insurgents decisively, a window which
may not open again. A U.S.-backed offensive by the
Northern Alliance of non-Pashtun tribes toppled the
hated Taliban regime and installed the government
of Hamid Karzai. However, the Bush administration
had no interest in a protracted nation-building mission. Instead of aggressively pursuing the Taliban and
al-Qaeda following Operation ANACONDA (March
2002), it handed over security responsibility to NATO’s International Stabilization Force (ISAF), refused
to commit a larger U.S. presence, and prepared to invade Iraq. The UN and a host of nongovernmental,
international, and private volunteer organizations
descended on Afghanistan to engage in development
and capacity building.
ISAF and its civilian counterparts not only failed
to improve significantly security and living conditions for ordinary Afghans, but they may have made
the situation worse. “The International Community’s
lukewarm response to Afghanistan after 9/11,” declared one regional expert, “has been matched only by
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its incompetence, incoherence, and conflicting strategies.”134 This statement may be overly harsh, but it
does correctly identify lack of a unified effort among
the myriad nations, agencies, and organizations as an
impediment to success of the polyglot mission. The
Rumsfeld Pentagon also applied the wrong approach
to internal security. For 6 years, the United States
treated the Taliban as “mere terrorists,” a threat that
could be countered by killing or capturing key leaders
in each group. Only in 2007 did the Pentagon begin
to appreciate what units on the ground had known
for some time: The Afghan government faced an intractable insurgency that would take years to resolve.
By that time, both the Taliban and al-Qaeda had regrouped, using bases in the Federally Administered
Tribal Area of neighboring Pakistan.
Although the Army had correctly diagnosed the
problem by 2008, a change of course would have to
wait for the results of that year’s presidential election.
Addressing cadets at the U.S. Military Academy on
December 1, 2009, President Barak Obama announced
a new strategy for Afghanistan. He would deploy an
additional 30,000 troops to augment the 32,000 already in country. At the same time, he promised that
the United States would “begin” to withdraw those
troops in 18 months (summer 2011).135 American forces
meanwhile transitioned from a failed counterterrorism strategy to a COIN strategy. “Clear” would be
replaced by “clear and hold” as the new guidance for
troops on the ground. At the same time, the United
States and its NATO allies would improve training
for Afghan security forces (army and police), placing
greater emphasis on preparing them for COIN operations. The United States also pressured its ally, Pakistan, to be more aggressive in combating the Taliban
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and al-Qaeda on its side of the border. Furthermore,
the United States increased strikes by predator drones
against insurgent and terrorist leaders, even targeting
these leaders on Pakistani soil. While the government
in Islamabad formally condemned the drone attacks,
it informally approved them, in some cases even providing the necessary targeting intelligence.
Based on the conclusions of this monograph, the
new strategy employs the correct COIN approach, including efforts by the Karzai government to negotiate
with the Taliban. However, without the political will
to sustain a lengthy campaign, even the best strategy
alone will not produce victory. Support for the war in
the United States is waning, while it has all but disappeared in Europe, especially since President Obama
now speaks of a 2014 end date for the mission with a
continued, albeit reduced, presence after that. Despite
some recent successes, things have not gone well, concluded a recent CBS News Report:
The situation in Afghanistan largely deteriorated in
2010, and an endgame—one that involves the United
States and its allies departing a stable Afghanistan
with a minimal terror threat and the capacity to handle its own security—is as elusive as ever.136

A number of factors have contributed to the difficult situation in Afghanistan. First and foremost, the
conflict has already degenerated into a chronic insurgency. The Taliban controls large areas of the country
and their sphere of control seems to be expanding.
While they do use intimidation and terror, their success results in no small measure from their ability to
exercise effective shadow governance in the territories
they control. The Taliban collects taxes, provides security, and dispenses justice. In 2008, they ran 13 “guer76

rilla courts,” hearing civil and criminal cases based on
their version of shari’a law, often with greater fairness
(at least in the eyes of local Pashtuns) than the official
courts.137 The Taliban funds their activity by taxing
all phases of opium production from poppy cultivation to refinement through smuggling.138 As long as
this situation persists, the insurgents do not have to
win an outright victory. They can pursue an “exhaustion strategy,” wearing down ISAF until it withdraws
and the Karzai government collapses.139 This strategy
shows every sign of working. At the November 2010
NATO summit, troop contributors reluctantly agreed
to extend their deployment to 2014 and to maintain
a training mission beyond that date. In a deliberately
vague statement, NATO Secretary- General Fogh Rasmussen stated that he did not “foresee (allied) troops
in a combat role beyond 2014, provided, of course,
that the security situation allows us to move into a
more supportive role.”140 President Karzai also wants
foreign troops out of his country and supports the
2014 withdrawal date.
Afghanistan’s neighbors further compound its security problems. Iran, one of the most implacable of
U.S. enemies, allows aid to flow across its border to
the insurgents. Pakistan, however, presents the greatest challenge. The Pashtun community to which the
insurgents belong extends across the ill-defined and
almost completely porous border between the two
countries. The Pakistani government exercises little
meaningful sovereignty over the Federally Administered Tribal Area along its northwest frontier, a buffer
zone created to protect British India, out of which the
Taliban and al-Qaeda operate. Islamabad plays a double game, publically backing the United States, while
privately aiding the Taliban whom it understandably
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believes may yet win the war. Objectionable as such
duplicity may be, it makes sense given Pakistan’s geopolitical situation. The United States and its allies will
leave sooner or later, while Afghanistan will remain
indefinitely as a neighbor and a security concern. Before the U.S.-led occupation, Islamabad had backed the
Taliban as part of its defense-in-depth strategy against
India, reasoning that a radical Islamist government
in Kabul would have nothing to do with New Delhi.
Only under extreme pressure did it reluctantly agree
to support the United States, a decision which remains
widely unpopular among the Pakistani people.
These disadvantages notwithstanding, the United
States can still get an acceptable outcome from the Afghanistan mission, provided it understands that “acceptable” does not mean “ideal.” Resolving Afghanistan’s chronic insurgency requires replacing Taliban
shadow governance with legitimate state sovereignty.
The complexity of the situation, the number of state,
non-state, and quasi-state actors precludes any simple
solution to this problem. Any successful strategy will
take several years to implement and longer to bear
fruit. Such a strategy might seek complete victory, but
all available evidence suggests that the conflict will be
more easily resolved through negotiation and compromise, just like the Group 4 cases discussed herein.
The Afghan government, supported by the United
States and ISAF, might continue its no-compromisewith-terrorists-or-insurgents policy. This approach
would require maintaining ISAF troop strength at least
at current levels and spending billions of dollars in aid
over at least the next decade. Such aid would have to
be delivered according to a unified plan that strengthened rather than weakened Afghan sovereignty. For its
part, the Karzai government would have to eliminate
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or at least seriously reduce corruption and commit to
truly democratic reform. These measures would probably not succeed, however, unless the government of
Pakistan committed to a determined, sustained effort
to eradicate Taliban and al-Qaeda safe havens on its
side of the border. Given the sympathy for the Taliban
within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Department and even the Pakistani army, the fragile nature of
the Pakistani state and the growing anti-Americanism
among the Pakistani population, such whole-hearted
cooperation seems unlikely. Asking the Karzai administration to clamp down on corruption engaged in by
the President’s own family seems an equally tall order. Meanwhile, U.S. public support for the sustained
effort necessary to defeat the Taliban also seems to be
waning. Thus while an all-out-victory strategy would
produce the most desirable result, it is also the most
costly and the least likely to succeed.
As an alternative, the Afghan government, supported by the United States and its allies, could adopt
a strategy of co-option, inviting the Taliban into a
power-sharing agreement. Power sharing might involve dividing up government offices and/or some
sort of federalized division of the country. This approach presupposes willingness on the part of the Taliban to negotiate such an arrangement. However, the
experience of Northern Ireland suggests that power
sharing only becomes possible when both sides reach
a military stalemate and see no value in continuing
the armed struggle. Given its revival and expansion into Pakistan over the past 4 years, the Taliban
has every reason to believe that it is winning. At this
point, it has little to gain from compromise. In addition, the Taliban leadership seems to have absorbed
al-Qaeda’s mission of continuing jihad, making them
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very unwilling to negotiate with infidels and heretics.
Whether these sentiments are genuine or merely rhetoric to help them gain outside support in the struggle
for power in Afghanistan remains to be seen.
As a third option (a variation of the co-option strategy), the Afghan government, backed by the U.S.-led
coalition, might fight the Taliban to a stalemate and
then reach an accommodation with it, recognizing
Taliban control of some Afghan territory. Such an accommodation might be the basis for a ceasefire and
negotiations. It also might result in a de facto partition
of Afghanistan and might encourage the Taliban to
create “Pashtunistan” by uniting with Pashtun tribes
in Pakistan. Creating a Pashtun state (de facto or de
jure) could, however, cause Pakistan to implode and
become the world’s first nuclear failed state.
A fourth option would be to divide and rule, not
from the top down, but from the bottom up. This approach would require exploiting the same cleavages
within tribal society that the Taliban have used so
successfully against the Afghan government. David
Kilcullen estimates that 90 percent of Taliban supporters within Afghanistan are “actually or potentially
co-optable,” though he insists that co-option would
have to be done from a position of strength.141 For such
a strategy to work, the Karzai administration would
have to engage in meaningful reform to eliminate corruption and re-incorporate disaffected tribal leaders
into local power structures, perhaps removing some
of his patronage appointees. It would also require reversing the shift of power promoted by the Taliban
from Maliks (tribal leaders) back to Mullahs (religious
leaders) in local communities and fostering sustainable grassroots development projects to improve the
quality of Afghan life. Finally, the poppy eradication
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effort would need to be brought into harmony with
the COIN campaign instead of being implemented in
its current haphazard, often unfair, manner, which
hurts small farmers while leaving large drug traffickers untouched.142 None of these measures will be possible without security, which means more ISAF and
Afghan troops to engage the Taliban and protect local communities. At the same time, the government
of Pakistan must eliminate or at least reduce Taliban
sanctuaries in its country. This approach offers the
best chance of success, but it is a tall order to fill and
will require a sustained commitment from the United
States and its allies for several years.
The United States is pursuing this sort of bottomup strategy while leaving open the door to a negotiated settlement. “You really have to take it a district
at a time—and maybe even more local areas than
that,” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told National
Public Radio in December 2010, “and diversify your
strategy depending on the local conditions, in terms
of whether presence contributes to security or detracts
from security. And that may differ from one valley
to the next.”143 At the same time that it employs this
grassroots strategy, the U.S.-led coalition continues to
pressure the Karzai government to diminish corruption and the Pakistani government to move more aggressively against Taliban safe havens on its territory,
especially those in North Waziristan. Meanwhile,
training of Afghan security forces continues. While
the current strategy contains the right combination of
activities, time seems to be working against it. “We
are breaking the momentum of the enemy and will
eventually reverse it,” Gates added during a December 2010 trip to Afghanistan. “It will be a while, and
we will suffer tougher losses as we go.”144 However,
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“a while” may be more time than the United States
has. Canada will withdraw its troops in July 2011, and
British Prime Minister David Cameron hinted during
his December 2010 visit to Afghanistan that he might
begin to bring British troops home at about the same
time, well ahead of the 2014 withdrawal date already
announced.145 Loss of these two NATO allies, the ones
whose troops have been most willing to fight the Taliban, would be a serious blow to the U.S.-led coalition.
Richard Haass, a member of the Bush administration foreign policy team, proposes a different version
of the grassroots strategy. Arguing that nothing the
United States is likely to achieve is worth the $100
billion a year being spent on Afghanistan and the increasing number of U.S. lives being lost in the conflict,
he proposes paying less attention to the Afghan government and supporting local leaders instead. This
“decentralization” strategy would, he maintains, restore the historic political balance in a country long
characterized by local autonomy and weak central
government. Instead of partition, this approach might
produce a “patchwork” quilt.146 However, as the UN
plans for Palestine (1947) and Bosnia (1993) have
shown, political quilts do not work very well in ethnically divided war zones.
There is, of course, a distinct possibility that the
conflict cannot be brought to a satisfactory conclusion
at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure no matter
what strategy the United States employs. The White
House and Pentagon should develop a worse-case
exit strategy, but even such an undesirable scenario
will require U.S. engagement with Afghanistan and
its neighbors. Some conflicts need to be contained
and managed rather than won. If the Taliban does
return to power and refuses to reach an accommoda-
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tion with Washington, the United States might revive
the old Northern Alliance as a foil for Kabul, although
this would probably result in de facto partition of the
country. The United States might also make clear that
it would hold any government in Kabul accountable
for terrorist attacks launched from Afghan soil, threatening to strike the country with stand-off weapons in
retaliation, a tactic that would put no U.S. service personnel at risk.
CONCLUSION
For almost 30 years following the Vietnam War,
the U.S. Army and many academics considered COIN
part of a receding colonial past, unlikely to trouble
them in the foreseeable future. Two protracted internal
wars have disabused everyone of that illusion. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are here to stay. While
no one in the U.S. military any longer doubts this fact,
how best to prepare for future COIN conflicts remains
problematic. The American military must maintain its
readiness to fight a conventional war anywhere in the
world while continuing to develop its unconventional
capability, struggling to educate and train that critical
commodity, the two-speed soldier—an effective war
fighter who can also meet the challenges of COIN. As
it meets this challenge, the United States must look to
its own experience and to that of other nations. The
road to the future lies through the past, via a careful
analysis not of a narrow selection of colonial COIN
campaigns, but through consideration of a broader selection of cases such as those presented in this monograph.
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